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ABSTRACT
Government neutrality toward religion is based on familiar

considerations: the importance of avoiding religious conflict,
alienation of religious minorities, and the danger that religious
considerationswill introducea dangerousirrationaldogmatism into
politics and make democraticcompromise more difficult. This Article
explores one consideration,prominentat the time of the framing,that
is often overlooked: the idea that religion can be corrupted by state

involvement with it. This idea is friendly to religion but, precisely for
that reason, is determined to keep the state away from religion.
If the religion-protective argument for disestablishment is to be

useful today, it cannot be adopted in the form in which it was
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understood in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, because in
that form it is loaded with assumptionsrooted in a particularvariety
of ProtestantChristianity.Nonetheless, suitably revised, it provides
a powerful reason for government, as a general matter, to keep its
hands off religious doctrine. It offers the best explanationfor many
otherwise mysterious rules of Establishment Clause law.
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Laws, especially those with ambiguous language, are interpreted
in light of their purposes.' The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, which states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion," is an example.2 One of its
core purposes was to prevent the corruption and degradation of
religion that the Framers associated with religious establishments.
The Clause, the Supreme Court has said, "stands as an expression
of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that
religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate."3 This rationale has been
neglected in modern Establishment Clause theory, but it can
explain and justify the shape of our law better than the prevention
of division along religious lines or of alienation, which are the
themes that dominate contemporary thought about disestablishment.
The corruption rationale has a problem, however. It cannot be
imported without modification into modern jurisprudence. Any
notion of "corruption," "degradation," or "perversion" implies a norm
or ideal state from which the degradation or perversion is a falling
off. That paradoxically raises Establishment Clause problems of its
own.
A claim that "we ought not to do A, because A is bad for B"
implies that (1) B is a good thing, and (2) we can tell what is good
and what is bad for B. Thus, any invocation of the corruption
rationale presupposes both that religion is a good thing and that we
can tell what is good and what is bad for religion. For example, the
Framers' understanding of the corruption rationale relied on
Protestant or Deist understandings of what uncorrupted religion
consisted in. No court today could embrace those understandings
without engaging in precisely the kind of intervention in live
theological controversy that the Clause was intended to forestall.
This difficulty has received almost no attention,4 but it poses a
1. This is a commonplace of statutory interpretation. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D.
SHAMBLE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:9 (7th ed. 2007).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431-32 (1962) (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIALAND
REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 183, 187 (1901)). As will be detailed below, this historical claim is accurate.
4. The only extended treatment of the problem of which I am aware is John Courtney
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fundamental challenge to the coherence of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
This Article will elucidate the difficulty and show how it can be
answered. The Framers' specific idea of the "religion" that must be
protected from corruption has been supplanted by a different idea
of religion, one that resists definition yet is quite clear in application. There is, in contemporary American culture, a proliferation of
different understandings of the good of religion. Yet, despite this
proliferation, we generally know religion when we see it. Many
people who are divided by these understandings converge on the
idea that the object of their contestation will be damaged and
degraded by state interference with it. Thus clarified, the corruption
rationale can explain many otherwise mysterious aspects of modern
Establishment Clause law-notably, the peculiar rule, which has
recently been formally stated for the first time, that older acknowledgements of ceremonial deism are probably constitutional, whereas
newer ones will be invalidated. It also offers a new justification for
that rule--one that is not really new, because it has been around for
350 years, but which has been obscured by the neo-Rawlsian
approach that is now so prominent in contemporary writing on
religious liberty.
Part I of this Article explores the gap in contemporary constitutional theory, and how the corruption argument can remedy it. Part
II examines the way in which the corruption argument depends on
a claim that religion is, in some way, a good thing. It also shows why
this claim is hard to cognize from within the framework of neoRawlsian political theory. Part III describes the classic formulations
of the claim, primarily by the founding generation. Part IV enumerates the central claims of the corruption thesis, showing how those
claims are closely tied to its religious roots, and thus apparently
presenting an insuperable Establishment Clause obstacle to a
court's making those claims. It also shows the failure of Justice
Murray, Law or Prepossessions?,14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1949), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 313-19. It is noted in 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 493 (2008), and may explain the caution with
which he deploys the corruption argument. It is also briefly noted by Douglas Laycock,
Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 324-26 (1996), who eschews
reliance on it because "these religious beliefs cannot be imputed to the Constitution without
abandoning government neutrality on religious questions." Id. at 324.
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Antonin Scalia's attempt to resolve this difficulty. Part V proposes
a revision of the idea that separates it from its Protestant roots.
Part VI responds to objections (including Rawlsian ones) to that
proposal. Part VII shows how the reformulation offered here makes
sense of the law.

I. THE GAP IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE THEORY
Consider some familiar and well-settled rules of Establishment
Clause law. The state may not engage in speech that endorses a
particular religion, or religion generally.5 It may not use a religious
test for office.' A law is invalid if it lacks a secular legislative
purpose,7 or if it purposefully discriminates against certain religious
practices.' Laws may not discriminate among religions.9
A theme that runs through this area of the law is the state's
incompetence to decide matters that relate to the interpretation of
religious practice or belief. The state may not attempt to determine
the "truth or falsity" of religious claims, 0 courts may not try to
resolve "controversies over religious doctrine and practice,"" may
not undertake "interpretation of particular church doctrines and
the importance of those doctrines to the religion,"' 2 may make "'no
inquiry into religious doctrine,""' 3 and may give "no consideration of
doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the
tenets of faith."' 4
Yet, at the same time, there is a broad range of official religious
practices that are tolerated. "In God We Trust" appears on the
currency, legislative sessions begin with prayers, judicial proceed5. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
6. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
7. See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 95-98 (2002), and cases

discussed therein.
8. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
10. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
11. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
12. Id. at 450.
13. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership v. Church of
God, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970)).
14. Md. & Va. Eldership,396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ings begin with "God save the United States and this Honorable
Court," Thanksgiving and Christmas are official holidays, and, of
course, the words "under God" appear in the Pledge of Allegiance.
The boundaries of this permitted "ceremonial deism" are unclear.
Prayers in school are unconstitutional, but not moments of silence."5
The Supreme Court's most recent set of decisions is particularly
confusing, holding that an official Ten Commandments display is
unconstitutional if 1it6 was erected recently, but not if it has been
around for decades.
Any account of the Establishment Clause needs to explain these
apparent inconsistencies. One can write them off as unprincipled
compromises, and many have.17 But it is possible to do better than
that.
The Establishment Clause has multiple purposes," so any argument about the basis of the Clause is going to be about what to
emphasize. Two accounts of the purposes of the Establishment
Clause dominate contemporary theory. One of these, whose leading
proponent was Chief Justice Warren Burger, focuses on political
division. 9 The other, principally articulated by Justice Sandra Day

15. See Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting an Establishment Clause
challenge to a Virginia statute authorizing school boards to establish a daily moment of
silence), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 996 (2001).
16. Compare McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (invalidating a recently
erected display), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding a forty-year-old
display). Justice Breyer, the only Justice in the majority in both cases, relied on the
divisiveness rationale in explaining his position. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700-04 (Breyer,
J., concurring). I will argue here that there are better grounds for his position than the ones
he stated.
17. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 86-87, 95-102; Douglas Laycock, Comment,
Theology Scholarships,the Pledgeof Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes
but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 223-31 (2004); Laura S. Underkuffler,
Through a Glass Darkly: Van Orden, McCreary, and the Dangers of Transparency in
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 59, 60-61 (2006). Some
writers have suggested that the entire body of Establishment Clause law reflects this kind
of unprincipled compromise. See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE
PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 215-16 (2005); FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS,
THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE 1-2, 5-6 (1995); Phillip Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First
Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 819 (1984).
18. See GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 6-13; Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic
Foundationsof the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 37-54 (2004).
19. See infra Part I.A.

1838

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1831

O'Connor, focuses on alienation.2 ° Doubtless these concerns are
among those that underlie the Establishment Clause. But a theory
that makes them central cannot explain or justify the specific rules
of law described above.
A. The PoliticalDivision Theory
Chief Justice Burger argued that a state program could be
unconstitutional because of its "divisive political potential."2 This
mattered because "political division along religious lines was one
of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect."22 Such division constituted "a threat to the
normal political process,"23 and "could divert attention from the
myriad issues and problems that confront every level of government."24 This argument has often been invoked in Supreme Court
opinions, though it is unclear that it has done any analytical work
in deciding cases.25
The most fundamental defect with this argument, as a basis for
a constitutional rule, is that political division is an unavoidable part
of life in a democracy. This division will frequently take the form of
religious division.26 It is not clear why division along religious lines
is worse than divisions along lines of race, gender, age, ethnicity, or
economic class.27 As a standard for constitutionality, the division
criterion is not administrable: it is impossible for a court to predict
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 623.
25. For a thorough catalogue of examples, see Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division,and
the FirstAmendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006). The argument has a large scholarly following.
See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON 3-4, 27-30 (2000);
Laycock, supra note 4, at 316-19; Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A
General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 357 (1996);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 198-99 (1992).
26. Religious division has in fact been a basis for political division throughout American
history. See A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 2-4 (1985). These
divisions have remained manageable, not because of judicial intervention, but because the
proliferation of religious factions has prevented any of them from gaining ascendancy. See
Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitutionof Religious Liberty: A
Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 726-30 (1987).
27. See generally Garnett, supra note 25.
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which measures will cause political division. 8 Moreover, the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions themselves have
been causes of political division; its decisions to invalidate prayer
and Bible reading in the public schools have been very unpopular.2 9
If the aim is to avoid division, then the law has been counterproductive. a°
B. The Alienation Theory
A second theory, championed by Justice O'Connor, is concerned with preventing a certain kind of political alienation. "The
Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence
to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community."3 l' Government may not take action that
endorses a particular religious view, because this "sends a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents
that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. '' 3' This criterion, O'Connor argues, is better able than any
rival conception to "adequately protect the religious liberty [and]
respect the religious 33diversity of the members of our pluralistic
political community.
28. LAURENCE

H.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1278-84 (2d ed. 1988).

29. See Douglas Laycock, Church and State in the United States: Competing Conceptions
and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 503, 527 (2006).
30. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 106-09 (1995).

31. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 688.
33. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627-28 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). This argument also has a large scholarly following.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 61-62, 122 (2007); Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of
Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2084-86 (1996); Steven G. Gey, Life After the
Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 17-21 (2007). Many writers draw on both
arguments. Thus, for example, Noah Feldman relies on the danger of political division to
argue for an absolute rule against public funding for religious activities, whereas he relies on
an alienation rationale for permitting government sponsored religious displays and prayers.
See FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 14-16. He is aware that his proposals present their own
dangers of division and alienation, but he does not explain how he knows how to quantify the
magnitudes on each side-how, for example, he knows that secularists' "concerns over
exclusion cannot effectively trump the sense of exclusion shared by the many Americans who
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It is not clear, however, how endorsement either threatens
religious liberty or fails to respect diversity. Endorsement, as such,
is purely symbolic. It does not restrict religious liberty in any
tangible way.34 As for respect for diversity, several commentators
have noted that it is not clear how endorsement is inconsistent with
it:

[I]t is not clear why symbolic exclusion should matter so long as
"nonadherents" are in fact actually included in the political
community. Under those circumstances, nonadherents who
believe that they are excluded from the political community are
merely expressing the disappointment felt by everyone who has
lost a fair fight in the arena of politics.3 5
To ask that no one be alienated from the results of political
decisionmaking is to ask too much. In a pluralistic culture, alienation is inevitable. "[S]ome beliefs must, but not all beliefs can,
achieve recognition and ratification in the nation's laws and public
policies; and those whose positions are not so favored will sometimes
feel like 'outsiders."'36 Once more, judicial intervention may simply
make things worse.3" Finally, the focus on alienation distorts the
Establishment Clause, transforming it from a prescription about
institutional arrangements into a kind of individual right, the right
not to feel like an "outsider. 38
In short, both the division theory and the alienation theory suffer
from the same defect. The pathology each seeks to prevent is in fact
not preventable. Division and alienation will happen no matter
what courts do. It is not clear why these effects, however regrettable
they may be, are worse when they are connected with religion.

want to express their religious values through politics." Id. at 16.
34. See Neil R. Feigenson, PoliticalStandingand Governmental Endorsement of Religion:
An Alternative to CurrentEstablishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 53, 65 (1990).
35. Mark Tushnet, The Constitutionof Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 712 (1986); see also
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,and Doctrinalillusions:EstablishmentNeutralityand
the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH.L. REV. 266, 307 (1987); David M. Smolin, Regulating
Religious and Cultural Conflict in Postmodern America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76
IOWA L. REv. 1067, 1097-99 (1991).
36. Smith, supra note 35, at 313.
37. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 30, at 109-15.
38. Smith, supra note 35, at 300.
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More particularly, the Establishment Clause rules discussed
above cannot prevent division and alienation. On the contrary, they
have sometimes exacerbated these problems. Because division and
alienation are so ubiquitous in politics, they do not provide a reason
to single out religion for special treatment; why is this kind of
division and alienation especially bad? If these are the purposes
that Establishment Clause law is supposed to serve, then the whole
body of law is radically misconceived and should be abandoned.
C. The ComparativeStrength of the CorruptionArgument
The corruption argument can clear up these puzzles. It is not
possible to prevent division and alienation, but it is possible to keep
government away from religion. All the rules we considered at the
beginning of this Article are well tailored to do that. They all
prevent government from deciding religious questions. Even the
sanctioning of ceremonial deism prevents government from deciding
religious questions: old ceremonies, which were broadly ecumenical
at the time that they were enacted, are allowed to remain, but they
are frozen in place. No new theological decisions are allowed to be
made.
The idea that religion can be damaged and degraded by state
involvement has nearly disappeared from contemporary Establishment Clause theory. The neglect is apparent, for example, in
Frederick Gedicks's (in many ways excellent and insightful) analysis
of the Supreme Court's treatment of religion.3 9 Gedicks thinks that
the Court is nominally committed to principles of "secular individualism," which are suspicious of and hostile toward religion, whereas
much of the country is devoted to a very different ethic, "religious
communitarianism," which permits the community to define itself
and its goals in expressly religious terms, and which exerts a
gravitational pressure of its own on constitutional interpretation.4 °
Contemporary doctrine, Gedicks thinks, is an incoherent congeries
of these incompatible elements. 41 His work articulates widely shared
assumptions about the character of contemporary controversies.4 2
39.
40.
41.
42.

See GEDICKS, supra note 17.
Id. at 117-22.
See id. at 4-7.
Noah Feldman draws a similar contrast between the legal views of"legal secularists"
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He omits, however, an important middle view, one that is friendly
to religion but, precisely for that reason, is determined to keep the
state away from religion. It is associated with the most prominent
early proponents of toleration and disestablishment, including
John Milton, Roger Williams, John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf,
Elisha Williams, Isaac Backus, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine,
John Leland, and James Madison. 4
The omission of this view makes the controversy over the
meaning of the Establishment Clause more polarizing than it needs
to be. If any interpretive question simply turns on a choice between
secular individualism and religious communitarianism, then in any
Establishment Clause controversy, the state is taking sides between
the forces of progressivism and religious traditionalism-in other
words, it is adjudicating the bitterest issues of theological controversy that divide American religion." There is no middle ground
between the two views, and compromise is impossible.
The corruption argument is important because it offers a way to
reframe the rhetoric of the Establishment Clause in a way that
could moderate these tensions and make it possible to find common
ground.
If the corruption argument for disestablishment is to be useful
today, however, it cannot be adopted in the form in which it was
understood in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, because in
that form it is loaded with assumptions rooted in a particular
variety of Protestant Christianity. Nonetheless, suitably revised, it
provides a powerful reason for government, as a general matter, to
keep its hands off religious doctrine.

and "values evangelicals." FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 6-8. His omission of religiously based
separatism from his diagnosis is noted in DARRYL HART, A SECULAR FAITH: WHY CHRISTIANITY
FAVORS THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 14-15 (2006), and Perry Dane, Separation
Anxiety, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 545, 546 (2007).
43. See infra Parts III.A-B.
44. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 26169 (1991); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 218-22 (1988).
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II. "CORRUPTION" AND THE FREE EXERCISE/ESTABLISHMENT
DILEMMA

Charles Taylor observes that there are three different strategies
by which modern political philosophy has tried to cope with religious
diversity. One, the "common ground strategy," seeks to establish
political ethics on the basis of premises shared across different
confessional allegiances: what all Christians, or even all theists,
believe.45 The difficulty with this approach is that as pluralism
grows, the common ground shrinks. The universal sentiments of
Christendom are not as universal as they once seemed. A second
understanding, the "independent political ethic" strategy, seeks to
abstract away from all our disagreements to something that is
independent of them.4 6 The aim is to infer, from certain fundamental preconditions of modern political life, conclusions about how
political life should be organized.4" Pluralism has also created a
problem for this approach: we may want to ignore God only for
political purposes, but if there are real live atheists in the society,
then the state, by endorsing an ethic that is independent of religion,
may appear to be taking their side on fundamental issues. The
difficulties with both of these approaches, Taylor thinks, create the
case for "overlapping consensus," which does not seek any agreement about foundations, but only acceptance of certain political
principles.48
Taylor borrows the term "overlapping consensus" from John
Rawls,4 9 but by it he means something considerably shallower, and
therefore less necessarily commited to neutrality toward contested
ideas of the good. Taylor thinks that "Rawls still tries to hold on to
too much of the older independent ethic."' Rawls expects citizens
45. Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31, 33 (Rajeev

Bhargava ed., 1998).
46. Id.
47. Id. Taylor observes that Grotius was an early explorer of this avenue: "We look for
certain features of the human condition which allow us to deduce certain exceptionless norms,
including those of peace and political obedience. Grotius would appear at times to be arguing
almost more geometrico." Id.
48. Id. at 51.
49. Id.

50. Id.
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not only to endorse a set of political principles, but also to accept a
doctrine of political constructivism and just terms of cooperation.5 1
This, Taylor thinks, is too much to ask.52 As a schedule of rights,
political liberalism for Taylor may suggest an independent political
ethic, but this ethic will inevitably be interpreted in light of any
interpreter's comprehensive view, and so will partake of the common ground strategy.
The regime of religious neutrality we actually have in the United
States today resembles an overlapping consensus as Taylor (but not
Rawls) understands it. The state is supposed to be neutral toward
religion. But, at the same time, religion is treated as something so
important that even political values are sometimes sacrificed for
its sake. This treatment of religion as a good is not a result that
could be reached within Rawlsian constructivism.5 3 Neutrality in
American law is based on a very abstract understanding of the
common ground. Because a Rawlsian approach excludes a common
ground strategy, contemporary neo-Rawlsians have understandably
had difficulty acknowledging the common ground elements of the
present regime.54
Federal and state law sometimes grant exemptions from laws
that presumably serve some valid purpose when the laws place a
burden on the free exercise of religion.5" This cannot be justified by
a purely political ethic, which would accommodate religion only
when the power or stubbornness of the pertinent religious group
made such accommodation prudent, would purge politics of religion
altogether because religion is irrational and dangerous, or would
make religious ideas a tool of politics whenever that seemed convenient."
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 467-82.
54. Prominent among these are Martha Nussbaum, Christopher Eisgruber, and Lawrence
Sager. See generally EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 33; MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF
CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008). They are
critiqued in Andrew Koppelman, Is it FairTo Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL.
L. REV. 571. Rawls and Nussbaum are further engaged infratext accompanying notes 467-82.
55. For a survey of statutes and court decisions adopting the rule, see Laycock, supra note
17, at 211-12 & nn.368-73. For a survey of situations in which the rule is applied, see 1 KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS (2006).

56. These were the positions taken by the purely political views that were held at the time
of the founding. See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
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The accommodation of religion gives rise to a puzzle in First
Amendment theory: how to reconcile free exercise with establishment principles. The Supreme Court has declared that "[n]either a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."57 The Establishment Clause "mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and nonreligion." 8 But the Court has also acknowledged
that "the Free Exercise Clause, ... by its terms, gives special
protection to the exercise of religion." 9 It is not logically possible for
the government to be both neutral between religion and nonreligion
and to give religion special protection. Some justices and many
commentators have therefore regarded the First Amendment as in
tension with itself.'0 Call this the free exercise/establishment
dilemma.
The solution to the dilemma, I have argued in earlier writings, 1
is that the government is permitted to treat religion as a valuable
thing, but only if "religion" is understood at such a high level of
EXPERIMENT 29-35 (2d ed. 2005).
57. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
58. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
59. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,713 (1981); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n one important respect, the Constitution is not
neutral on the subject of religion: Under the Free Exercise Clause, religiously motivated
claims of conscience may give rise to constitutional rights that other strongly held beliefs do
not.").
The privileged status of religion was somewhat diminished after Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that there is no right to religious exemptions from
laws of general applicability. Even after Smith, however, religions retain some special
protection that nonreligious beliefs do not share. In Churchof the Lukumi BabaluAye v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the Court struck down four ordinances that a city had
enacted with the avowed purpose of preventing a Santeria church from practicing animal
sacrifice. The laws, the Court held, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
because their object was the suppression of a religious practice. Id. at 542, 547. The result
would have been different if the law had targeted a club that did exactly what the Santeria
did, not as part of a religious ritual, but because its members thought that killing animals was
fun.
60. As the Supreme Court put it recently, "the two Clauses ...
often exert conflicting
pressures." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
61. See generallyShari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, MeasuredEndorsement,
60 MD. L. REv. 713 (2001); Koppelman, supra note 54; Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly
Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 729 (2003);
Koppelman, supranote 7; Andrew Koppelman, Akhil Amar and the EstablishmentClause,33
U. RICH. L. REV. 393 (1999).
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abstraction that the state is forbidden from endorsing any theological proposition, even the existence of God. Accommodation is
permissible so long as government does not discriminate in its
accommodations between theistic and nontheistic religions. I will
discuss this argument in more detail in the conclusion. This Article
argues that the explanatory power of the corruption argument is
further evidence that my account is correct.
The corruption argument, I have already noted, rests on the core
assumptions that religion is valuable and that neutrality exists in
order to protect it. This is apparent in the Court's most extensive
statement of the corruption argument. In a decision invalidating a
state's imposition of a nonsectarian, state-composed prayer to be
read in public schools, the Court explained:
[The] first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment
Clause] rested on the belief that a union of government and
religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.
The history of governmentally established religion, both in
England and in this country, showed that whenever government
had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect
and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same
history showed that many people had lost their respect for any
religion that had relied upon the support of government to
spread its faith. The Establishment Clause thus stands as an
expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our
Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to
permit its "unhallowed perversion" by a civil magistrate.62
The Court makes two arguments here. The first is a contingent
sociological claim that establishment tends to produce negative
attitudes toward the "particular form"6 3 of religion that is established. The second runs much deeper. In the final sentence, the
Court claims that there is something fundamentally impious about
establishment.' It breaches the "sacred" and the "holy."6 It is
remarkable to find such prophetic language in the U.S. Reports,
62.
63.
64.
65.

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962) (quoting MADISON, supra note 3, at 187).
Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
Id. at 431-32.
Id. at 432.
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but it has appeared there repeatedly,6 especially in opinions
written by Justice Hugo Black, the principal architect of modern
Establishment Clause theory.6"
The most prominent contemporary proponent of this view is
Justice David Souter. In four dissenting opinions, two of which
were signed by one vote short of a majority of the Justices, and one
concurrence, he has invoked the corruption argument as a reason
for maintaining a strict rule that the state may not provide aid to
religion in any form, even in a neutral program that does not aid

66. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The
favored religion may be compromised as political figures reshape the religion's beliefs for their
own purposes; it may be reformed as government largesse brings government regulation.");
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 645 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("The government-sponsored display of the menorah alongside a Christmas
tree also works a distortion of the Jewish religious calendar.... Mhe city's erection alongside
the Christmas tree of the symbol of a relatively minor Jewish religious holiday ... has the
effect of promoting a Christianized version of Judaism."); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,
640 n.10 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment protects not only the State
from being captured by the Church, but also protects the Church from being corrupted by the
State and adopted for its purposes."); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1985) ("When
the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of religious significance
... the freedom of even the adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental
intrusion into sacred matters."); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)
(favored religions may be "taint[ed] ... with a corrosive secularism"); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 804 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that one "purpose of separation and
neutrality is to prevent the trivialization and degradation of religion by too close an
attachment to the organs of government"); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 775
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting "the pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to tempt
religious schools to compromise their religious mission without wholly abandoning it"); Sch.
Dist. of Abingdon v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is not
only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the
civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a
creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government.");
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 59 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have staked the
very existence of our country on the faith that complete separation between the state and
religion is best for the state and best for religion.").
67. See infra text accompanying notes 287-319.
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religion as such.6" I will examine Justice Souter's arguments in
Part V.
III. THE CLASSIC FORMULATIONS OF THE CLAIM

As noted earlier, any notion of "corruption" or "perversion"
implies a norm or ideal state from which the corruption or perversion is a falling off.69 A claim that "we ought not to do A, because
that is bad for B," implies (1) that B is a good thing, and (2) that we
can tell what is good and what is bad for B. Thus the Court's claim
presents, in a different form than accommodation, the same
problem: it presupposes that religion is a good thing, and that we
can tell what is good and what is bad for religion.
These ideas made perfect sense at the time of the founding. They
played a large role in the movement toward disestablishment. But
68. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-12 (2002) (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the Establishment Clause aims
"to save religion from its own corruption," and "the specific threat is to the primacy of the
schools' mission to educate the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of
their faith"); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871 (2000) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (stating that "government aid corrupts religion"); Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 243 (1997) (Souter, J., joined in this part of his opinion by Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) ("[R]eligions supported by governments are compromised just as
surely as the religious freedom of dissenters is burdened when the government supports
religion."); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 891 (1995) (Souter,
J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("[T]he Establishment Clause ...
was meant not only to protect individuals and their republics from the destructive
consequences of mixing government and religion, but to protect religion from a corrupting
dependence on support from the Government."); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 615 (1992)
(Souter, J., joined by Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (quoting with approval Madison's
statement that "religion & Govt. will both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed
together." Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 105, 106 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)); Weisman,
505 U.S. at 627 (quoting the same passage again, and citing the importance of "protecting
religion from the demeaning effects of any governmental embrace").
Perhaps one should also count his dissent in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007), which quotes with approval Justice Black's statement that the
Framers thought "individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government
which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions."
Id. at 2588 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (quoting
Everson, 330 U.S. at 11).
69. Vincent Blasi has noted that ideas of "corruption" or "distortion" of religion "are
meaningless in the absence of a baseline." Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious
Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
783, 798 (2002).

20091

CORRUPTION OF RELIGION

1849

they depend on contestable theological claims. The claim's basis is
at least as ancient as Jesus Christ's insistence on distinguishing the
things that are Caesar's from the things that are God's.7" It was
pervasive during the period of the founding. Here I will focus on its
leading expositors, but variations on the claim appear in much
popular rhetoric of the time.7 '
A. Precursors
The generation that enacted the Establishment Clause did not
invent the corruption argument. It had been around for over a
century. Here we consider the most prominent early statements of
the argument.
1. John Milton
The corruption argument against establishment emerged roughly
simultaneously in England and America. We will begin with John
Milton because he was writing against establishment in its classic
form. The central elements of the English religious establishment
were government control over the doctrines, structure, and liturgy
of the state church; mandatory attendance at the religious worship
services of the state church; public financial support of the state
church; prohibition of religious worship in other denominations; the
use of the state church for civil functions; and the limitation of
political participation to members of the state church." There was
also a restriction of the dissemination of heretical doctrines by

70. See Mark 12:17;Matthew 22:21; Luke 20:25. Other early Christian formulations of the
separation claim are briefly described in PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE 21-38 (2002), and John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1869, 1876-86 (2003). For earlier English and American Protestant formulations, see
THOMAS G. SANDERS, PROTESTANT CONCEPTS OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUNDS AND APPROACHES FOR THE FUTURE 184-202 (1964).
71. See, e.g., THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 130, 144, 156, 168 (1986); HAMBURGER, supra note
70, at 5 n.7, 55, 74-75, 121-22, 124, 170-71; LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 64-67, 124 (2d ed. 1994).
72. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the
Founding,PartI: Establishmentof Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2003).
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means, inter alia, of licensing of the press: it was illegal to publish
anything without prior permission of the Crown.73
Milton was opposed to all of these but attacked different strands
of the Establishment in different writings. In Areopagitica,4 Milton
argued for the abandonment of licensing. This, he admitted, would
allow the proliferation of heretical religious doctrines, and so
undermine the established church's monopoly over religious opinion.75
Milton insisted that even correct religious doctrine would not
bring about salvation if it was the consequence of blind conformity
rather than active engagement with religious questions. "A man
may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only because
his pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing
other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds
becomes his heresy."7 6 Religious salvation was to be achieved only
by struggle against temptation: "Assuredly we bring not innocence
into the world, we bring impurity much rather: that which purifies
us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary.""v It follows that "all
opinions, yea errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service
and assistance toward the speedy attainment of what is truest.""v

73. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 6 (1985).
74. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprintedin JOHNMILTON: COMPLETE POEMSAND

MAJOR
75.
76.
77.
78.

PROSE 716 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., 1957) [hereinafter AREOPAGITICA].
See id. at 748.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 727. The importance of a free choice between good and evil is likewise

emphasized in JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST (1667), reprinted in JOHN MILTON: COMPLETE

POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE, supra note 74, at 257 [hereinafter PARADISE LOST]. The speaker
here is God the Father, explaining why it was right to allow the rebel angels and, later, Adam
to transgress:
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.
Not free, what proof could they have giv'n sincere
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love,
Where only what they needs must do, appeard,
Not what they would? what praise could they receive?
What pleasure I from such obedience paid,
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice)
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil'd,
Made passive both, had serv'd necessity,
Not mee.
Id. at 260.
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The truth did not need state assistance to prevail:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon
the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing
and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and
open encounter.79
The state, moreover, is likely to err in deciding what ideas to
restrict: "if it come to prohibiting, there is not aught more likely to
be prohibited than truth itself; whose first appearance to our eyes
bleared and dimmed with prejudice and custom, is more unsightly
,,'Even if errors can be
and unplausible than many errors ....

prevented by coercion, "God sure esteems the growth and completing of one virtuous person more than the restraint of ten vicious."'"

What matters is not outward conformity, but adherence to the
inner light. All that coercion can produce is "the forced and outward
union of cold and neutral and inwardly divided minds." 2 On the
other hand, the pluralism that toleration would produce is not a bad
thing; "those neighboring differences, or rather indifferences, ...
whether in some point of doctrine or of discipline, ... though they be
many, need not interrupt 'the unity of spirit,' if we could but find
among us the 'bond of peace."'' 3
79. AREOPAGITICA, supra note 74, at 746.
80. Id. at 748.
81. Id. at 733.
82. Id. at 742.
83. Id. at 747-48; see also PARADISE LOST, supra note 78, at 262-63, where the sincere
intent of prayer is much more important than its content:
Some I have chosen of peculiar grace
Elect above the rest; so is my will:
The rest shall hear me call, and oft be warn'd
Thir sinful state, and to appease betimes
Th' incensed Deity while offer'd grace
Invites; for I will clear thir senses dark,
What may suffice, and soft'n stony hearts
To pray, repent, and bring obedience due.
To prayer, repentance, and obedience due,
Though but endeavor'd with sincere intent,
Mine ear shall not be slow, mine eye not shut.
And I will place within them as a guide
My Umpire Conscience, whom if they will hear,
Light after light well us'd they shall attain,
And to the end persisting, safe arrive.
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Christopher Hill observes that Milton's theology rests on a radical
Arminianism, in which salvation is available to all men who believe,
and is in no way dependent on the formal ceremonies of Catholicism
or the Anglican Church.' In sacraments as Milton understands
them, "it is the attitude of the recipient that matters, not the
ceremony. 8' 5 This radical individualism was connected with a range
of heretical religious views, many of them idiosyncratic to Milton.8 6
Prominent among these was the priesthood of all believers: anyone
with a gift for making the Word of God known should be free to
disseminate it. 87 Milton's defense of free speech depended crucially
on his religious views. 8 Given Milton's individualism, there was
little of value left for a state-sponsored church to do.
Thus, Milton opposed any state funding for the support of
ministers. The desire for state support, Milton argued, reflected
"covetousness and unjust claim to other men's goods; a contention
foul and odious in any man, but most of all in ministers of the
gospel." s State-mandated tithes for the established clergy "give men
just cause to suspect that they came neither called nor sent from
above to preach the word, but from below, by the instinct of their
own hunger, to feed upon the church."' The clergy's claim to a share
of each person's earnings, Milton observed, had led to "their seizing
of pots and pans from the poor, who have as good right to tithes as
they; from some, the very beds," from which "it may be feared that
many will as much abhor the gospel, if such violence as this be
suffered in her ministers, and in that which they also pretend to be

84. CHRISTOPHER HILL, MILTON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 268-78 (1977).
85. Id. at 306.
86. See id. at 233-337. His religious views rested on a reading of biblical authority that
was equally idiosyncratic. See Regina M. Schwartz, Milton on the Bible, in A COMPANION TO
MILTON 37 (Thomas N. Corns ed., 2001).
87. See WILLIAM HALLER, LIBERTY AND REFORMATION IN THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 56-64
(1955).
88. See Vincent Blasi, Ralph Gregory Elliott First Amendment Lecture: Milton's
Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment (Mar. 1, 1995), in 1995 Yale L. Sch.
Occasional Papers, Paper 6, available at http://lsr.nellco.orgcgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1007&context-yale/ylsop.
89. JOHN MILTON, CONSIDERATIONS TOUCHING THE LIKEIEST MEANS To REMOVE
HIRELINGS OUT OF THE CHURCH (1659), reprinted in JOHN MILTON: COMPLETE POEMS AND
MAJOR PROSE, supra note 74, at 856, 857.
90. Id. at 870.
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the offering of the Lord."'" Such support was fundamentally
unchristian, because
the Christian church is universal; not tied to nation, diocese, or
parish, but consisting of many particular churches complete in
themselves, gathered not by compulsion or the accident of
dwelling nigh together, but by free consent, choosing both their
particular church and their church officers. Whereas if tithes be
set up, all these Christian privileges will be disturbed and soon
lost, and with them Christian liberty.92
State support likewise elevates the civil power over God, subjecting the church to the "political drifts or conceived opinions"9 3 of the
civil ruler, and thus "upon her whose only head is in heaven, yea,
upon him who is her only head, sets another in effect, and, which is
most monstrous, a human on a heavenly, a carnal on a spiritual, a
political head on an ecclesiastical body."9 4
Some authorities have suggested that state support of religion
should not be deemed to violate the Establishment Clause unless
someone is coerced to support a religion with which they disagree.95
Certain versions of the corruption argument, we shall see, condemn
only coercive establishments, whereas others reach any state support for religion. Milton falls into the latter category. He never
seems to have considered the possibility of a noncoercive establishment, but the argument just quoted reaches such an establishment
as well. Any state influence over religion is an usurpation.

91. Id. at 866.
92. Id. at 865.
93. Id. at 872; cf. id. at 878 ("For magistrates ... will pay none but such whom by their
committees of examination they find conformable to their interests and opinions: and
hirelings will soon frame themselves to that interest and those opinions which they see best
pleasing to their paymasters; and to seem right themselves, will force others as to the truth.").
94. Id. at 872.
95. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693-94 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment,27 WM. & MARY L. REv.
933, 938-39 (1986). For a critique of claims that this was the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause, see Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another
False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 37 (1991).
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2. Roger Williams
In the Americas, the germinal formulation of the corruption
argument is that of Milton's friend Roger Williams, who invented
the modern, religiously tolerant state when he founded Rhode
Island in 1635. Williams also was one of the first to use the
metaphor of the "wall of separation" between church and state; his
overriding concern was that, absent such a wall, the church would
be corrupted by the world.
Williams's religious views are deeply alien to modern sensibilities. He was no secular individualist. Timothy Hall observes that
Williams was "a religious fanatic" who "did not champion a protoecumenism and was not the sort of person likely to attend an
interfaith community worship service."' Williams's weirdness
shows the breadth of the range of views that can join in an overlapping consensus.97 Common ground can be found even between

modern liberals and the likes of Williams.
Williams's political views grew out of his religious ideas. 8
Williams was a part of the Separatist movement, which held that
only those who had personally received God's grace could partake in
the sacrament of communion.9 The Puritans who believed this
eventually concluded that they had to leave the Church of England,
which ministered to saints and sinners alike, and form new, separate churches."0 Williams accepted this argument, and eventually
radicalized it by holding that the Separatist churches of New
England were unregenerate as long as they did not publicly repent
for ever having had anything to do with the Anglican church. 01'
96. TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS

LIBERTY 6, 18 (1998).
97. Hall notes this and uses the term on pp. 8-10, 147, and 165. The parallel between
Williams and Rawls is developed in NUSSBAUM, supra note 54, at 57-63. See also EDMUND S.
MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE 115-26 (1967) (discussing Williams's

political philosophy).
98.. Nussbaum claims that Williams "nowhere alludes to these beliefs in arguing for
liberty of conscience-nor should he, since it is his considered position that political principles
should not be based on sectarian religious views of any sort." NUSSBAUM, supra note 54, at 43.
This is true of some of Williams's arguments. It is not, however, true of his argument that
establishment corrupts religion.
99. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 17, 22-23.
100. Id. at 15-17.
101. Id. at 20.
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Even regenerate persons, such as Martin Luther or the martyrs
burned by Queen Mary, were unqualified for church membership
until they repented their past associations with corrupted churches,
whether Catholic or Anglican. 2 Similar logic led him to hold that
10 3
a man should not pray with his wife unless both were regenerate.
The Puritans departed from English establishment by separating
religious from political authority. No clergyman held any public
office in early Massachusetts.0 4 The state was responsible, however,
for the spiritual welfare of its citizens, and heresy was a punishable
offense;' 5 Williams himself was exiled for his heretical views. 106
Ministers were supported by taxes, and voting and public office were
restricted to church members.0 7
Williams condemned all this. Religious activity, Williams
thought, was worthless unless it was sincere: "what ever Worship,
Ministry, Ministration, the best and purest are practiced without
faith and true perswasion that they are the true institutions of God,
they are sin ....
,o Authenticity of belief was, on the contrary, the
central requirement for salvation. If one held that some points of
doctrine were so fundamental that salvation was impossible without
believing them, Williams wrote,
I should everlastingly condemne thousands, and ten thousands,
yea the whole generation of the righteous, who since the falling
away (from the first primitive Christianstate or worship) have
and doe erre fundamentally concerning the true matter,constitution, gatheringand governingof the Church:and yet farre be it
from a pious breastto imagine that they are not saved, and that
their soules are not bound up in the bundle of eternall life."°

102. Id. at 37.
103. Id. at 27.
104. Id. at 70.
105. Id. at 71-72.
106. Id. at 71.
107. Id. at 74-76.
108. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION (1644), reprinted in 3 THE
COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 1, 12 (Samuel L. Caldwell ed., 1963).
109. Id. at 64. On the other hand, Williams evidently presupposes in this passage that he
is only talking about Christians. He does not suggest that people exposed to the Christian
message who rejected it in favor of a competing nonchristian view could be saved. Thanks to
Kent Greenawalt for pressing me on this point.
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State coercion to participate in religious services was sinful for
everyone present; it corrupted the service by introducing the
presence of sinners, and it lulled the sinners into a false sense of
security, hiding from them their awful condition.11 ° Moreover, no
human being had the power to start churches-that right was
reserved to God-and so the people could not delegate to the state
an authority (control over religion) that they did not themselves
possess."' To subject religion to temporal power was thus "to pull
God and Christ, and Spirit out of Heaven, and subject them unto
naturall, sinfull, inconstant men, and so consequently to Sathan
himselfe, by whom all peoples naturally are guided ....
11'
Williams's defense of freedom of conscience was crucially dependent on his ideas about the incompetence of government in religious
matters. He did not value freedom for its own sake. For Williams,
Perry Miller observes,
freedom was something negative, which protects men from
worldly compulsions in a world where any compulsion, most of
all one to virtue, increases the quantity of sin. Liberty was a way
of not adding to the stock of human depravity; were men not
sinful, there would be no need of freedom." 3
In nonreligious matters of morality that (he thought) affected the
public safety, in which he included quarreling, disobedience,
prostitution, uncleanliness, and lasciviousness, the state could
1 4
legitimately coerce even those who were motivated by religion. 1
Williams did not favor religious exemptions as such, though he did
worry that government's claim to be pursuing legitimate public
interests might sometimes be a mask for religious persecution.1 1 5
Conscience should be respected, not because it was less likely to err
in religious matters, but rather because the conscientious search for

110. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 32, 139.
111. Id. at 89.
112. WILLIAMS, supra note 108, at 250.
113. PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERIcAN TRADITION 29
(1962).
114. MORGAN, supra note 97, at 126-35. But see NUSSBAUM, supra note 54, at 49-50
(arguing that the logic of Williams's position entails religious accommodation).
115. HALL, supra note 96, at 103-11, 120-21.
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religious truth was the only possible path to salvation."6 Although
only a few people could be saved,
conscience alone could bring even
7
this small number to God.1
A consequence of disestablishment that troubled most of Williams's contemporaries was that voluntary contributions might not
be enough to support churches. This did not bother Williams
because he thought that only false churches existed in the world,
and, therefore, the world would be no worse if they all disappeared. "8 It followed from Williams's radical individualism that any
religious institution at all was a corruption of Christianity. The
worthlessness of any state-sponsored church was a corollary.
If you do not accept the theological premises of Separatism, then
Williams's arguments about corruption will not move you at all. But
it was by way of his Separatism that he arrived at a view of the
proper role of government that bracketed religious controversy from
public life.
Because Williams's theological views are so pessimistic and
intolerant, he is a wonderful counterexample to Jean-Jacques
Rousseau's dictum that "[iut is impossible to live in peace with
people whom one believes are damned.""' 9 It is hard to find another
American thinker who was as convinced as Williams that his
neighbors were headed for the inferno. 2 °
116. See MORGAN, supra note 97, at 130-42.
117. See id.
118. William G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the Separation of Church and State in
America, 73 AM. HIST. REV. 1392, 1408 (1968).
119. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 131 (Roger D. Masters ed.,
Judith R. Masters trans., 1978) (1762).
120. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965), appropriates Williams in a
strange way. Howe, throughout the book, draws a contrast between the Jeffersonian,
secularist view of separation, which he disfavors, and that of Williams, who feared "the
worldly corruptions which might consume the churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness
were not maintained." Id. at 6. He takes as evidence that the Williams view better represents
our traditions, what he calls the "de facto establishment," which embraces "a host of favoring
tributes to faith" such as Sunday closing laws, the use of God on the currency, legislative
prayers, Thanksgiving proclamations, and so forth. Id. at 11. He uses the term because "this
social reality, in its technical independence from law, bears legally some analogy to that ugly
actuality known as de facto segregation." Id.
This gives rise to several puzzles. What Howe describes is not de facto at all, but de jure.
De facto segregation is segregation in which the state does not officially give recognition to
race at all, or even silently but intentionally take race into account. What Howe calls de facto
establishment is a set of practices in which the state behaves in overtly religious ways and
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3. John Locke
The idea that state authority over religion can corrupt religion
is likewise emphasized in John Locke's Letter Concerning
Toleration.2 ' The central target of the Letter is the forcible
repression of those who dissented from the doctrines of the Anglican
church. The punishment of dissent in Restoration England was
severe, with about 10 percent of the country's population subject to
confiscation of goods, imprisonment, and deportation.'2 2 Locke
dissented from all this. The position he advocated was shortly to be
enacted in the Toleration Act of 1689,123 which granted freedom of
worship to Protestant Trinitarian dissenters who took an oath of

proclaims religious truth. "Ceremonial deism" would be a better term for these practices. (In
fact, the Court has never used "de facto establishment," but there have been a few references
to "ceremonial deism" in the opinions.) When Justice Brennan introduced that term, he wrote:
[S]uch practices as the designation of "In God We Trust" as our national motto,
or the references to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance ...
can best be
understood, in Dean Rostow's apt phrase, as a form of "ceremonial deism,"
protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost
through rote repetition any significant religious content.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Perhaps ceremonial deism can be justified. But Williams would be a strange authority to
invoke on its behalf. Williams' suspicion of state control over religion would appear logically
to extend to any degree of ceremonial support for religion. The draining of religious meaning
through rote repetition is just the kind of degradation of religion of which Williams was
afraid. That is why Rhode Island did not have an established church. If the state is
incompetent to adjudicate religious matters, then why should it be authorized to declare that
there is one God, and that the Hindus, Buddhists, and atheists are mistaken about this? This
question never occurs to Howe. One can imagine what Williams would have thought of the
modern Christmas display, paid for by tax dollars secured through the influence of the local
merchants association, reminding us that Christ suffered and died on the cross so that we
could enjoy great holiday shopping.
On the limits of Howe's reading of Williams, see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 54, at 41-42,
59, and GARRY WILLS, HEAD AND HEART: AMERICAN CHRISTIANITIES 97 (2007).
Steven B. Epstein's Rethinking the Constitutionalityof CeremonialDeism, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 2083 (1996), points out that ceremonial deism is inconsistent with the main thrust of
contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine. But his argument is not conclusive because
there are always two ways of resolving an inconsistency. When he tries to defend a rule of
neutrality, the sole concern on which he relies is the alienation of nonbelievers. Id. at 2168-71.
He does not rely on the corruption argument at all. This unnecessarily weakens his argument.
121. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (James H. Tully ed., 1983) (1689).
122. James H. Tully, Introductionto LOCKE, supra note 121, at 2.
123. Id. at 1.
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allegiance.' 2 4 (That Act also ended the repressive Massachusetts
regime that Williams had opposed.'2 5 )
Locke argued that "the Care of Souls is not committed to the Civil
Magistrate, any more than to other Men."'26 One reason was the
limited responsibilities of the state, which existed, according to his
well-known social contract theory, solely in order to protect life,
liberty, and property. 27 But another was that "no Man can, if he
would, conform his Faith to the Dictates of another."'28 Coerced
worship, Locke argued, would be "Hipocrisie, and Contempt of his
Divine Majesty."' 29 Coercion of worship is absurd, because what it
produces has no religious value.
Although the Magistrates Opinion in Religion be sound, and the
way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet if I be not
thoroughly perswaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no
safety for me in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall
walk in, against the Dictates of my Conscience, will ever bring
me to the Mansions of the Blessed.13 °
Moreover, the religious divisions that existed "for the most part"
concerned "frivolous things ... that (without any prejudice to
Religion or the Salvation of Souls, if not accompanied with Superstition or Hypocrisie) might either be observed or omitted." Such
matters ought not to divide "Christian Brethren, who are all agreed
in the Substantial and truly Fundamental part of Religion.''
These arguments reach only coercion, and so do not speak directly
to gentler forms of state authority over religion. Locke aspired to a
social unity that crossed denominational lines, but one that only
included Christians.13 2 But Locke also thought that the state was
generally incompetent to adjudicate religious questions:

124. Id. at 1-3.
125. See CURRY, supra note 71, at 83.
126. LOCKE, supra note 121, at 26.
127. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press
2003) (1690).
128. LOCKE, supra note 121, at 26.
129. Id. at 27.
130. Id. at 38.
131. Id. at 36.
132. WILLS, supra note 120, at 177-83.
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The one only narrow way which leads to Heaven is not better
known to the Magistrate than to private Persons, and therefore
I cannot safely take him for my Guide, who may probably be as
ignorant of the way as my self, and who certainly is less concerned for my Salvation than I my self am. 3'
Locke's argument is, of course, loaded with religious premises:
that conscience is valuable because it is a way of discovering God's
will; that it is sinful to act against conscience; that the rights of
conscience are inalienable; and that no one can legitimately grant
to another the right to make one's religious decisions.'
4. Samuel Pufendorf
The same premises animate the German philosopher Samuel
Pufendorf s Of the Nature and Qualificationof Religion in Reference
to Civil Society,'3 5 written in 1687, two years before Locke's Letter,
in reaction to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by King Louis
XIV. The revocation outlawed Protestantism in France. Pufendorf
is not a direct source for American constitutional thought, but he
was widely read and influential. When the first English translation
of this work was published in 1698, Pufendorf "was already
renowned in England and elsewhere in Europe" for his writings on
natural law, which "were to play a major role in the shaping of
German, Scottish, and French moral and political philosophy up to
the American and French Revolutions.' 3 6
Pufendorf began with the premise that "every body is obliged to
worship God in his own Person, Religious Duty being not to be
performed by a Deputy, but by himself, in Person, who expects to
133. LOCKE, supra note 121, at 37.
134. This is emphasized in SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 30, at 64-67;
JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE'S

POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002), especially at 208-11; and Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible:
Settling the Just Bounds Between Churchand State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2259-60 (1997).
135. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE NATURE AND QUALIFICATION OF RELIGION IN REFERENCE

TO CIVIL SOCIETY (Simone Zurbuchen ed., Jodocus Crull trans., 2002) (1689).
136. Simone Zurbuchen, Introduction to PUFENDORF, supra note 135, at x-xi. However,
"[e]xcept for the treatises on natural law, little is known about the translation and reception
of Pufendorfs works in Great Britain." Id. at xvii. The American colonists during the
revolutionary period were quite familiar with his work. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23, 27, 29, 43, 150 (enlarged ed. 1992).
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reap the Benefit of religious Worship, promised by God Almighty.' ' 7
The state could have nothing to do with this: truth could only be
imparted by convincing arguments, and revelation "must be
acquired by the assistance of Divine Grace, which is contrary to all
Violence."13 God left people free to choose whether to be saved:
It was not God Almighty's pleasure to pull People head-long into
Heaven, or to make use of the new French way of Converting
them by Dragoons; But, he has laid open to us the way of our
Salvation, in such a manner, as not to have quite debarr'd us
from our own choise; so, that if we will be refractory, we may
39
prove the cause of our own Destruction."
If orthodoxy is forcibly imposed, "by such Methods, perhaps the
Commonwealth may be stock'd with Hypocrites, and dissembling
Hereticks, but few will be brought over to the Orthodox Christian
Faith." 4 The existence of open dissent may even "contribute to the
encrease of the Zeal and Learning of the established Clergy," as
evidenced by the fact that "in those places and times, where and
when no Religious Differences were in agitation, the Clergy soon
degenerated into Idleness and Barbarity."'' Pufendorfs book is
replete with biblical quotations and citations.
Note how the character and scope of the threatened corruption
depends on the nature of the religion that needs to be protected
from corruption. Unlike Williams, Pufendorf did not deny that
churches are legitimate institutions. Unlike Milton or Locke, he did
not deny the competence of the state to determine religious matters.
For Pufendorf, corruption consisted in the forcing of individual
consciences and the suppression of views regarded by the sovereign
as heretical.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

PUFENDORF, supra note 135, at 13.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 109.
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5. Elisha Williams
The religious character of the corruption argument is perhaps
clearest in Congregationalist minister Elisha Williams's The
EssentialRights and Libertiesof Protestants.4 2 Williams's pamphlet
denounced a 1742 Connecticut law prohibiting ministers from
preaching outside their own parishes:
That the sacred scriptures are the alone rule of faith and
practice to a Christian, all Protestants are agreed in; and must
therefore inviolably maintain, that every Christian has a right
of judging for himself what he is to believe and practice in
religion according to that rule .... Every one is under an indis-

pensable obligation to search the scripture for himself (which
contains the whole of it) and to make the best use of it he can for
his own information in the will of GOD, the nature and duties of
Christianity. And as every Christian is so bound; so he has an
unalienable right to judge of the sense and meaning of it, and to
follow his judgment wherever it leads him; even an equal right
with any rulers be they civil or ecclesiastical.... That faith and
practice which depends on the judgment and choice of any other
person, and not on the person's own understanding judgment
and choice, may pass for religion in the synagogue of Satan,
whose tenet is that ignorance is the mother of devotion; but with
no understanding Protestant will it pass for any religion at all.'
The idea that beliefs founded on the authority of other people are
worthless, so prominent in Milton, appears again in Williams:
Now inasmuch as the scriptures are the only rule of faith and
practice to a Christian; hence every one has an unalienable right
to read, enquire into, and impartially judge of the sense and
meaning of it for himself. For if he is to be governed and determined therein by the opinions and determinations of any others,

142. ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESANTS (1774),
reprintedin POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, at 51 (Ellis Sandoz ed.,
2d ed. 1998).
143. Id. at 55, 61, 62. Williams also relies on a Lockean social contract theory about the
limited jurisdiction of the state, id. at 56-61, 82-83, but he obviously does not stop there.
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the scriptures cease to be a rule for him, and those opinions and
determinations of others are substituted in the room thereof."'
The principle of establishment, Williams argued, "has proved the
grand engine of oppressing truth, Christianity, and murdering the
best men the world has had in it; promoting and securing heresy,
superstition and idolatry; and ought to be abhorred by all Christians."'45
Williams did not, however, object to noncoercive endorsement of
religion: "if by the word establish be meant only an approbation of
certain articles of faith and modes of worship, of government, or
recommendation of them to their subjects; I am not arguing against
it.""' Thomas Curry observes a deep tension within Williams's
views on this point. He and other Congregationalist writers
"assumed that there existed a fundamental Christianity that every
reasonable Christian could advocate and, consequently, that the
State could promote without violating anyone's conscience."' 47 This
"usually took the form believed in by themselves." 4 ' But they would
become uncomfortable as soon as the state began to promote
positions with which they disagreed.
Williams's entire argument is premised on a set of obligations
that "all Protestants are agreed in."'" From those obligations derive
limitations on state power. If you do not accept his Protestant
premises, however, the argument can have no weight at all.
B. The Founding Generation
Proponents of the corruption argument at the time of the
founding came out of two very different religious factions. By far,
the more numerous were the Baptists, led by Isaac Backus and John
Leland. But the principal spokespersons for the argument were
Enlightenment Deists such as Jefferson, Paine, and Madison.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 63.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 73.
CURRY, supra note 71, at 118.
Id.
WILLIAMS, supra note 142, at 55.
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1. Isaac Backus
The minister Isaac Backus wrote "the most complete and wellrounded exposition of the Baptist principles of church and state in
15 He and his much younger colleague
the eighteenth century.""
John Leland, discussed below, were the leaders of the Baptist
movement for separation. Like his admired predecessors Roger
Williams and John Locke, Backus was centrally concerned about
corruption: "bringing in an earthly power between Christ and his
people has been the grand source of anti-Christian abominations
.,151 Backus's specific target was the levying of religious taxes
upon those who did not subscribe to the established religion and the
jailing of unlicensed preachers.1 52 Both were persistent grievances
of the Baptists.
Like all the other writers we have examined, Backus relied on the
voluntarist premise:
As God is the only worthy object of all religious worship, and
nothing can be true religion but a voluntary obedience unto his
revealed will, of which each rational soul has an equal right to
judge for itself, every person has an unalienable right to act in
all religious affairs according to the full persuasion
of his own
153
mind, where others are not injured thereby.

150.

William G. McLoughlin,

Introduction to ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND
(William G.McLoughlin ed. 1968) [hereinafter

CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789, at 1, 41-42

Introduction].
151. ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1773), reprintedin
ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 150, at 303, 334 [hereinafter
AN APPEAL].

152. Introduction,supra note 150, at 31. "Though [Backus was] never imprisoned himself,
he was several times in imminent danger of it." Id. at n.11.
153. ISAAC BACKUS, ISAAC BACKUS' DRAFt FOR A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE MASSACHUSETTS
CONSTITUTION (1779), reprintedin ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra

note 150, at 487. Put another way, "in religion each one has an equal right to judge for
himself, for we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ...." AN APPEAL, supra note
151, at 332. William McLoughlin notes that the individualism here is very different from that
of a Deist such as George Mason, who wrote in the Virginia Declaration of Rights that religion
"can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence...." Introduction,supra
note 150, at 47. 'The pietist wanted religious freedom so that men may follow the Truth of
Revelation; the deist wanted it so men might seek the Truth wherever reason may lead.
Id. at 48; see also McLoughlin, supra note 118, at 1403-04 (drawing a similar contrast with
Jefferson).
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After some agonizing on the issue, he rejected infant baptism.'5 4 He
thought preachers should be those who feel God's call. External
qualifications, such as a college education or ordination, hindered
God's work.'55
Christian establishment did not lead to pure religion. Rather,
"tyranny, simony, and robbery came to be introduced and to be
practiced so long, under the Christian name .....
' Ministers who
sought state support were unchristian:
[C] an any man in the light of truth maintain his character as a
minister of Christ if he is not contented with all that Christ's
name and influence will procure for him but will have recourse
to the kings of the earth to force money from the people to
support him under the name of an ambassador of the God of
Heaven.'57
Religious duties could not be delegated: "In all civil governments
some are appointed to judge for others and have power to compel
others to submit to their judgment, but our Lord has most plainly
forbidden us either to assume or submit to any such thing in
religion .....
"' The state was also an unreliable source of religious
guidance. "[A]s all earthly states are changeable, the same sword
that Constantine drew against heretics, Julian turned against the
orthodox."' 9
Backus was, however, a less strong separationist than his ally
Jefferson. He did not oppose official proclamation of fast days and
days of prayer. 6 ° He supported a law confining public officeholding
to Christians. 6 ' He endorsed a petition requesting Congress to
create a bureau to license the publication of Bibles, lest there be
erroneous or heretical translations.'6 2 He did not object to laws

154. Introduction,supra note 150, at 8-9.
155. Id. at 29.
156. ISAAC BACKUS, POLICY AS WELL A HONESTY (1779), reprinted in ISAAC BACKUS ON
CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 150, at 367, 373.
157. AN APPEAL, supra note 151, at 314.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 315.
160. Introduction,supra note 150, at 50-57.
161. Id. at 50.
162. Id. at 51; see also CURRY, supra note 71, at 217.
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requiring attendance at church. 163 In one tract, he opposed paying
Episcopalian chaplains for Congress, but, McLoughlin observes,
"that was because they were Episcopalians."'" Backus's views on
church and state, McLoughlin concludes, were "far less logical and
consistent" than those of his better-known contemporaries Madison,
Jefferson, or even Leland." 5 Rather, his view resembled that of the
proponents of noncoercive establishment, such as John Adams,
who regarded the rights of conscience as "indisputable, unalienable,
indefeasible, [and] divine," yet who nonetheless favored statesupported establishments.1 66
2. Thomas Jefferson
Thomas Jefferson, the quintessential rational Enlightenment
proponent of separation, also relied on religious arguments about
the corrupting effects of establishment. In his 1777 Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,"' he proposed to do away with all
religious coercion and all taxation to support churches: "no man
shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship
place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained,
molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise
suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief ...."168
Jefferson, too, relied on theological premises. He noted that
"Almighty God hath created the mind free," '6 9 and from this he
inferred that

163. CURRY, supra note 71, at 170.
164. 2 WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1883: THE BAPISTS AND
THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 931 (1971).

165. Introduction,supra note 150, at 50.
166. John Witte, Jr., 'A Most Mild and EquitableEstablishmentof Religion" John Adams
and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. CHURCH & ST. 213, 217 (1999). This inconsistency
weakened the Baptists' position politically. "Congregationalists found it difficult to believe
that Baptist preoccupation with ministerial maintenance was anything more than a
rationalization of self-interest on the part of people who wanted to avoid spending money."
CURRY, supra note 71, at 176.
167. Thomas Jefferson, Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1777), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 346 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
168. Id. at 347. Jefferson reported drafting the bill in 1777; it was enacted, with some
deletions, in 1786. Id. at 1554.

169. Id. at 346.
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all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments, or
burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of
hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of
the holy author of our religion, who being lord both of body and
mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was
in his Almighty power to do ...."o
He also noted the state's incompetence:
[T]he impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well
as ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others,
setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only
true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on
others, hath established and maintained false religions over the
greatest part of the world and through all time ....171
He specifically invoked corruption: establishment "tends also to
corrupt the principles of that very religion it is meant to encourage,
by bribing, with a monopoly of worldly honours and emoluments,
those who will externally profess and conform to it

...

And all

this was unnecessary. Echoing Milton, Jefferson wrote that "truth
is great and will prevail if left to herself ...."173
He repeated these arguments a few years later in his Notes on the
State of Virginia.'74 He explained that religious dissent in Virginia
had been fostered by establishment: "the great care of the government to support their own church, having begotten an equal degree
of indolence in its clergy, two-thirds of the people had become
dissenters at the commencement of the present revolution.' 7 5
Establishment was a violation of natural right. "[O]ur rulers can
have authority over such natural rights only as we have submitted
to them. The rights of conscience we never submitted, we could not

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 347. That the prevention of corruption is the dominant theme in Jefferson's bill
is argued in WILLS, supra note 120, at 191-97.
173. Jefferson, supra note 167, at 347.
174. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1788), reprinted in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 167, at 123.
175. Id. at 283.
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submit. We are answerable for them to our God."' 76 The effect of
religious coercion has been "[t]o make one half the world fools, and
the other half hypocrites."' v But Jefferson's argument, too, goes
beyond coercion to imply a more general state neutrality toward
religion. "Difference of opinion is advantageous in religion. The
several sects perform the office of a Censor morum over each
other.' 78
Thus, Jefferson famously advocated a "wall of separation between
church and State.''

7'

He eliminated the chairs of Divinity at the

College of William and Mary and prevented such chairs from being
established at the University of Virginia, which did not even have
a chaplain while he was its rector. 80°
Jefferson's idea of corruption was quite distinct from that of the
earlier thinkers we have considered because he was a Deist who
regarded any religious mystery as a foolish superstition. He was
an admirer of Joseph Priestley's A History of the Corruptions of
Christianity,'' which denounced such core Christian doctrines as
the resurrection and the Trinity." 2 While he was President, he
prepared a new, corrected version of the Bible, using scissors and a
razor to excise from the New Testament any claim of the divinity of
Jesus.' The corruption of Christianity consisted precisely in its
capture by institutions that sought state largesse:
My opinion is that there would never have been an infidel, if
there had never been a priest. The artificial structure they have
built on the purest of all moral systems, for the purpose of
176. Id. at 285.
177. Id. at 286.
178. Id.
179. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a Committee
of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra
note 167, at 510.
180. THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787, at

62-65 (1977); LEVY, supra note 71, at 70-75.
181. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE CORRUPTIONS OF CHRISTIANITY (1782).

182. He wrote to Adams that he had read the book "over and over again." DAVID L. HOLMES,
THE FAITHs OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 82 (2006). He "recommended it for students at the
University of Virginia as the work most likely to wean them from sectarian narrowness."
SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 48

(1963).
183. See JAROSLAV PELIKAN, JESUS THROUGH THE CENTURIES: HIS PLACE IN THE HISTORY
OF CULTURE 189-93 (1985).
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deriving from it pence and power, revolt those who think for
themselves, and who read in that system only what is really
there." 4
Jefferson's view had the potential to overlap with that of the
religious proponents of disestablishment we have considered earlier.
Because his theological views were so different, however, they
implied a dramatically different understanding of what counted as
corruption.
3. Thomas Paine
Similar to Jefferson, but even starker in his rejection of traditional religious dogmas, was Thomas Paine. Paine was the author
of Common Sense,"5 "the most incendiary and popular pamphlet of
the entire Revolutionary era
"186 His Deism places him well
outside the mainstream of contemporary American religion, though
87
the ideals he articulates were pervasive among the educated elite. 1
He trumpeted ideas that other Framers, such as George Washington
and Benjamin Franklin, privately believed but thought it prudent
to keep to themselves.' 8 8
Paine believed in God, but rejected all of the specific doctrines of
Christianity, which he regarded as a collection of unbelievable
superstitions. He thought that "religious duties consist in doing
justice, loving mercy, and endeavouring to make our fellow-creatures happy."'8 9 This, he thought, was the true teaching of Jesus
Christ, but institutionalized Christianity "has set up a religion of
pomp and of revenue, in pretended imitation of a person whose life

184. MEAD, supra note 182, at 46 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. M.
Harrison Smith (Aug. 6, 1816)). This letter was written late in Jefferson's life. As Noah
Feldman notes, Jefferson became more radical about religious matters as he grew older, but
even in his early career he sometimes expressed anticlerical views in private. FELDMAN, supra
note 17, at 39.
185. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776).
186. GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERIcAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 55 (2002).

187. On the place of Deism in eighteenth-century America, see HOLMES, supra note 182,
at 1-51 (2006).
188. See id. at 56, 65-68.
189. THOMAS PAINE, THE AGE OF REASON (1795), reprinted in THE THOMAS PAINE READER

395, 400 (Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick eds., 1987).
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was humility and poverty."1" Establishment corrupted religion
precisely insofar as state support tended to perpetuate "wild and
whimsical systems of faith and of religion. ' 19 '
The adulterous connection of church and state, wherever it has
taken place, whether Jewish, Christian or Turkish, has so
effectually prohibited by pains and penalties every discussion
upon established creeds, and upon first principles of religion,
that until the system of government should be changed, those
subjects could not be brought fairly and openly before the world;
but that whenever this should be done, a revolution in the
system of religion would follow. Human inventions and priestcraft would be detected; and man would return to the pure,
unmixed and unadulterated belief of one God, and no more. 92
Paine confirmed the worst fears of proponents of establishment
by holding that without state support, the central dogmas of
Christianity would wither away. Paine, however, regarded this as
cause for celebration.
4. John Leland
It was not necessary to be a Deist in order to support strong
separation. One of Jefferson's most loyal allies was the Baptist
minister John Leland.'9 3 Like Backus, Leland was primarily
concerned with systems of taxation and licensing that burdened
nonconforming religions. 9 4 Far more consistent than Backus, he
strongly opposed any involvement of the state in religious
matters. 1 95 He was an important source of the pressure to promise
an amendment banning establishment in exchange for the ratifica-

190. Id. at 417.
191. Id. at 442.

192. Id. at 401. Benjamin Franklin held a similar view of "the essentials of every religion,"
which were unfortunately, in many religions, "more or less mix'd with other articles, which,
without any tendency to inspire, promote, or confirm morality, servd principally to divide us,

and make us unfriendly to one another." MEAD, supra note 182, at 64.
193. See HAMBURGER, supra note 70, at 156-57.
194. See L. H. Butterfield, Elder John Leland, Jeffersonian Itinerant, 62 PROC. Am.
ANTIQUARIAN Soc. 154, 172-76 (1952).
195. See CURRY, supra note 71, at 176.
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tion of the Constitution."9 There are even unconfirmable stories
indicating that, had Madison not promised Leland to work for such
an amendment, Leland would have
derailed the Constitution by
97
blocking ratification in Virginia.'
Leland, like the other writers we have examined, took religious
voluntarism as a basic premise.
Every man must give an account of himself to God, and therefore
every man ought to be at liberty to serve God in that way that he
can best reconcile it to his conscience. If government can answer
for individuals at the day of judgment, let men be1 98controled by
it in religious matters; otherwise let men be free.
The state was an unreliable source of religious guidance:
It is error, and error alone, that needs human support; and
whenever men fly to the law or sword to protect their system of
religion, and force it upon others, it is evident that they have
something in their system that will not bear the light, and stand
upon the basis of truth.1"
Establishments foster contempt for religion; they "metamorphose
the church into a creature, and religion into a principle of state;
which has a natural tendency to make men conclude that bible
religion is nothing but a trick of state."200 Even if nonconformity
were tolerated, but certain beliefs favored, "the minds of men are
biassed to embrace that religion which is favored and pampered by
law (and thereby hypocrisy is nourished) while those who cannot
stretch their consciences to believe any thing and every thing in the
established creed are treated with contempt and opprobrious
196. See Butterfield, supra note 194, at 155, 183-84.
197. Id. at 183-96; Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant
Paternity,1990 SUP. CT. REv. 301, 323-24. The evidence that the meeting did take place is
marshaled in greater detail in Mark Scarberry, John Leland and James Madison: Religious
Influence on the Ratification of the Constitution and on the Proposalof the Bill of Rights, 113
PENN. ST. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009).
198. JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTs OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE (1791), reprinted in 2
POLITICAL SERMONS OFTHE FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, at 1079, 1085 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d ed.
1998).
199. Butterfield, supra note 194, at 199.
200. LELAND, supra note 198, at 1087.
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names." '' The state should not have any power to provide for
ministers, enact Sabbath laws, pay military chaplains, or have any
religious qualifications for office.2 °2 He opposed a proposal to end
delivery of the mail on Sundays.0 3
Leland was as suspicious of dead religious forms as Milton. He
opposed Sunday schools, theological seminaries, and missionary
societies because their "natural tendency" was "to reduce the gospel
to school divinity, and represent the work of the Holy Unction in the
heart, to be no more than what men can perform for themselves and
for others; and also to fill the ministerial ranks with pharisaical
hypocrites."20 4 Even communion was of doubtful value because after
"more than thirty years experiment, I have had no evidence that the
bread and wine ever assisted my faith to discern the Lord's body.205I
have never felt guilty for not communing, but often for doing it."
A common strand in all of these arguments is religious individualism-the view that religious truth was a matter between the
individual and God. Thomas Sanders observes that Leland brought
the individualism of the Enlightenment into religion by abandoning
the Puritan conception of a community governed collectively by
God's law. "The form, nature, and significance of the church receded
behind a preoccupation with the conversion of single souls, and the
church represented no more than a voluntary compact of individuals."20 6 This assumption was pervasive at the time of the founding.
In the late eighteenth century, Mark Noll observes, most Americans
shared both a mistrust of intellectual authorities inherited from
previous generations and a belief that true knowledge arose
from the use of one's own senses-whether the external senses
for information about nature and society or the moral sense for
ethical and aesthetic judgments. Most Americans were thus
united in the conviction that people had to think for themselves

201. Id.
202. See CURRY, supra note 71, at 176.
203. McLOuGHuIN, supra note 164, at 932; THE WRITINGS OF ELDER JOHN LELAND 561-70
(L.F. Greene ed., 1845).
204. Butterfield, supra note 194, at 235.
205. Id. at 205-06.
206. SANDERS, supra note 70, at 193.
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in order to know science, morality, economics, politics, and
especially theology. 2"
A state-sponsored orthodoxy was as counterproductive in theology
as it would be in any of these other fields. Salvation was a matter
for the individual. "My best judgment tells me that my neighbor
does wrong," Leland wrote, "but guilt is not transferable. Every one
2 8
must give an account of himself.""
Yet, despite his alliance with Jefferson, Leland was no rationalist.
He preached "the great doctrines of universal depravity, redemption
by the blood of Christ, regeneration, faith, repentance, and selfdenial."2 9 He once heard the voice of God speaking to him. One
night, some devilish ghost approached his bed, groaning so horribly
that Leland hid under the bedclothes and prayed to God for help. He
said, "I know myself to be a feeble, sinful worm."2' 10 Yet, he was
indifferent to most theological controversies.2 Feeling mattered to
him more than doctrine.2 12 He made Jeffersonian political philosophy appealing to his poor, ignorant, and enthusiastic followers, and
thus "succeeded in linking the political philosophy of the American
enlightenment with the camp-meeting spirit. 2 13
5. James Madison
The radical Protestantism of Backus and Leland and the Deism
of Jefferson and Paine were brilliantly synthesized by James
Madison in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, 2 4 the classic description of the pathologies that the
207. MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA'S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN 11
(2002).
208. Butterfield, supra note 194, at 239.
209. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 164, at 931.
210. Id.
211. See Butterfield, supra note 194, at 158.
212. At Baptist revivals, he wrote:
Such a heavenly confusion among the preachers, and such a celestial discord
among the people, destroy all articulation, so that the understanding is not
edified; but the awful echo, sounding in the ears, and the objects in great
distress, and great raptures before the eyes, raise great emotion in the heart.
Id. at 170.
213. Id. at 242.
214. MADISON, supra note 3.
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founding generation associated with establishment. Madison, of
course, is the one who actually led the movement for disestablishment, first leading the fight in Virginia, then as principal author of
the First Amendment.
Madison's argument reaches well beyond coercion because it was
offered against a bill that attempted to provide nonpreferential aid
to religion. The bill in question would have allowed all Christian
churches to receive tax money, and would have permitted each
taxpayer to designate the church to receive his tax.215 If the
taxpayer refused to designate a church, the funds would go to
schools.216 Even this nonpreferential aid, Madison thought, tended
to corrupt religion.
Madison was a rationalist Deist. He deplored the fact that
"accidental differences in political, religious, and other opinions"
were the cause of factional disputes.21 7 "However erroneous or
ridiculous these grounds of dissention and faction may appear to
the enlightened Statesman, or the benevolent philosopher, the
bulk of mankind who are neither Statesmen nor Philosophers, will
continue to view them in a different light."2 8 The coalition he led,
however, consisted predominantly of Baptists and Presbyterians. All
supported freedom of conscience, thought that religion was essentially voluntary, and regarded man's allegiance to God as prior to
state authority. 2 9 But the rationalists "emphasized natural rights"
and "the use of reason in the pursuit of [religious] truth," whereas
the religious dissenters wanted to free man "to respond to God's
call" and "the scriptural ... teachings of Christ. ' 22' Each side drew on
the other's rhetoric, but they had fundamentally different goals.2"2'
Madison's task was to bring them together into a political coalition
that could disestablish Anglicanism in Virginia. 2
215. A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (1784), reprinted
in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 app. at 72-74 (1947).
216. Id.
217. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in THE REPUBLIC OF
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THoMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON, 1776-

1826, at 495, 501 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995).
218. Id.
219. BUCKLEY, supra note 180, at 179.
220. Id. at 179-80.
221. See id.
222. The heterogeneity of Madison's coalition is emphasized in Laycock, supra note 4, at
343-47.
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The Memorial and Remonstrance begins with a theological claim,
offering an understanding of religious duty that at this point will be
familiar: 'Itis the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This
duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to
the claims of Civil Society."22 Madison further argued that the idea
"that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious truth
...
is an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions
"" The idea that religion should be promoted
of Rulers in all ages ....
because it is conducive to good citizenship, an idea that we often
hear even today, Madison denounced as an attempt to "employ
Religion as an engine of Civil policy," which he thought "an unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation."22' 5 Moreover,
experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead
of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a
contrary operation. During almost fifteen centuries, has the
legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have
been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in
the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution.22
Madison was reticent about his own religious beliefs, which
were probably some variant of Deism,22 7 but the Memorial and
Remonstranceis nonetheless the most useful source of antiestablishment thinking. It was a public document, not a private statement of
Madison's views. It presented a synthesis of the antiestablishment
views that prevailed in his time, combining religious arguments
designed to appeal to Evangelical Christians and secular arguments
223. MADISON, supra note 3, at 184-85.
224. Id. at 187.
225. Id.
226. Id. The importance of the corruption theme in the Memorial and Remonstrance is
further elaborated in WILLS, supra note 120, at 207-22.
227. See HOLMES, supra note 182, at 91-98 (2006). For some evidence that Madison was,
at least early in his life, sincere in holding the religious views stated in the Memorial, see
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 64-91 (1998). The specific claims about corruption in the Memorial are
also made in his private correspondence, both early and late in his life. See THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE PoLITIcAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 2-5, 341 (Marvin Meyers
ed., rev. ed. 1981).
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designed to appeal to Enlightenment Lockeans.2 28 It is unlikely that
these groups agreed on anything more than the propositions stated
by Madison himself. But they did agree on them.229
What Madison achieved in Virginia is a fine early example of the
kind of overlapping consensus contemplated by Charles Taylor.3 ° A
collection of very different comprehensive views of the purpose of
human life converges on a set of political principles. The Memorial
and Remonstrance states a set of pathologies that are to be avoided,
which can be regarded as pathologies from a variety of different
points of view. Different members of his coalition had different ideas
about why these were pathologies. They had fundamentally different ideas of what a noncorrupted religion would look like. Madison
was carefully noncommittal about which of them was right. The
coalition did not last long; it shortly fragmented over support for the
French Revolution.2"' But by that time, the Establishment Clause
had been adopted, and it remains in the Constitution.
Later, as President, Madison vetoed a congressional act incorporating an Episcopal congregation in the District of Columbia, and at
first refused to issue proclamations of days of thanksgiving and
228. On the variety of religious positions to which Madison was appealing, see BUCKLEY,
supranote 180, at 179-80, and WITTE, supra note 56, at 21-35. Vincent Phillip Mufioz observes
that "Madison leaves it unclear whether the 'Memorial's' argument is theological, strictly
rational, or both." Vincent Philip Mufioz, James Madison's Principleof Religious Liberty, 97
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 17, 22 n.13 (2003).
229. Douglas Laycock has explained why someone interested in the original meaning of
disestablishment might focus on the Virginia debate in which Madison's was the most
important document:
The state debates help show how the concept of establishment was understood
in the Framers' generation. Learning how that generation understood the
concept may be more informative than the brief and unfocused debate in the
House [on the First Amendment. The Senate debate was not recorded.]. If the
Framers generally understood the concept in a certain way, and if nothing
indicates that they used the word in an unusual sense in the first amendment,
then we can fairly assume that the Framers used the word in accordance with
their general understanding of the concept....
For several reasons, the debates in Virginia were most important. First, the
arguments were developed most fully in Virginia. Second, Madison led the
winning coalition, and he played a dominant role in the adoption of the
establishment clause three years later. Third, the debates in Virginia may have
been the best known.
Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aidto Religion:A False Claim About Original Intent, 27
WM. & MARY L. REv. 875, 895 (1986).
230. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
231. SANDERS, supra note 70, at 211-12.
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prayer." 2 He later did issue such proclamations,2 33 but still later,
said that this was a mistake. In an unpublished memorandum
written late in his life and found after his death, he opposed the
creation of congressional and military chaplains.23 4
C. Other Formulations
We have concluded our review of the use of the corruption
argument up to the time of the framing of the First Amendment.
There are, however, three other writers who have had such a
powerful influence on modern thinking about the corrupting effect
of establishments that they should be considered here. Two of them,
Adam Smith and Alexis de Tocqueville, are major political theorists.
The third, Justice Hugo Black, is the principal architect of modern
Establishment Clause doctrine. The following discussion also briefly
examines the view of disestablishment that prevailed at the time of
the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment. That material is
pertinent because it is the Fourteenth Amendment that makes the
Establishment Clause applicable to the states.
1. Adam Smith
Adam Smith did not participate in the framing. He never traveled to the United States, spending most of his life in his native
Scotland. But he was widely read in America. The Wealth of
Nations2 35 was found in 28 percent of American libraries in the
period from 1777-1790, exceeding the holdings of Locke's Treatises
and any book by Rousseau except Emile."6 Smith had a substantial
impact on the thinking of the Framers of the Constitution, and
particularly on Madison's views about religious liberty.23 7
232. James Madison, Detached Memorandum (ca. 1820), with accompanying notes, in
MICHAEL W. McCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 67-69 (2d ed. 2006).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1981) (1776).
236. Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith's Reception Among the American Founders,17761790, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 897, 901 (2002).
237. Id. at 907.
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Smith focused not on coercion, but on state financial support for
an established church. He thought that if clergy were given
dependable incomes from the state, "[t]heir exertion, their zeal and
industry,"" 8 were likely to be much diminished:
The clergy of an established and well-endowed religion frequently become men of learning and elegance, who possess all
the virtues of gentlemen, but they are apt gradually to lose the
qualities, both good and bad, which gave them authority and
influence with the inferior ranks of people, and which had
perhaps been the original causes of the success and establishment of their religion." 9
Smith was responding to his friend David Hume's defense of
established churches. In a passage that Smith quoted at length,
Hume argued that the "interested diligence" of the clergy, spurred
by the need for voluntary contributions of support, "is what every
wise legislator will study to prevent; because, in every religion
except the true, it is highly pernicious, and it has even a natural
tendency to pervert the true, by infusing into it a strong mixture of
2 4 Such superstitious
superstition, folly, and delusion.""
delusions,
together with "the most violent abhorrence of all other sects," is
what is most likely to draw customers.24 ' The way to avoid this
pernicious behavior by the clergy is "to bribe their indolence, by
assigning stated salaries to their profession, and rendering it
superfluous for them to be farther active, than merely to prevent
their flock from straying in quest of new pastures." '4 2
Smith agreed that, absent establishment, each pastor would be
pressed to try to increase the number of his disciples. "But as every
other teacher would have felt himself under the same necessity, the
success of no one teacher, or sect of teachers, could have been very
great."' 3 The consequence would be "a great multitude of religious

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

2 SMITH, supra note 235, at 788.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 791 (quoting DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1778)).
Id. (quoting HUME, supra note 240).
Id. (quoting HUME, supra note 240).
Id. at 792.
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sects."244 This pressure would in turn produce a better religion than
an establishment could:
The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves almost alone,
would be obliged to respect those of almost every other sect, and
the concessions which they would mutually find it both convenient and agreeable to make to one another, might in time
probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them to that
pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity,
211
imposture, or fanaticism ....
Smith also thought that small religious sects were much more likely
than large churches to police the conduct of their members and keep
them away from the dangers of profligacy and vice that were
particularly ubiquitous in large cities.2 4
Samuel Fleischacker thinks it unlikely that Madison had read
The Wealth of Nations at the time he wrote the Memorial and
Remonstrance, but argues that the arguments against establishment just cited did have an influence on Madison's famous argument in Federalist10247 that political factions could more easily be
controlled in a large republic.248 Madison there responded to the
widespread concern that in democracies majorities will be prone to
oppress minorities. Federalist10 claimed that this danger would be
averted by the size of the new American republic that the Constitution would create.
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to
act in unison with each other.249

244. Id.
245. Id. at 793.
246. Id. at 795-96.
247. James Madison, FederalistNo. 10, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 45 (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
248. See Fleischacker, supra note 236, at 907.
249. FederalistNo. 10, supra note 247, at 51.
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Madison made the point specifically with respect to religious
factions: "A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in
a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the
entire face of it must secure the national councils against any
danger from that source."25
Fleischacker observes the similarity between Madison's analysis
of factions and Smith's analysis of sects: mutual conflict makes both
weaker and less capable of achieving pernicious ends that they
regard as their good. Both thought that deep features of human
nature produce this result:
[P]eople generally want to be addressed in truthful, decent
terms, rather than with the accent of passion and prejudice,
strong emotions driving fanaticism tend to dominate only for
short periods of time and are discouraged in normal social
intercourse, and people have economic and other interests
connecting them with a great range of others in society.25'
Because social forces tended to temper the problem, there was less
need for enlightened statesmen to do the job. "Both Madison and
Smith saw the liberty that gave rein to such interests as compatible
with a republic that would be concerned, for the most part, with
fostering virtue."25' 2 For both, uncorrupted religion could be known
by its fruits: peaceable, virtuous behavior.
It is worth noting for a moment here a now-familiar argument
that neither of them was making, but that is easily confused with
theirs. That is the idea that religion is improved by market-like
competition, in which the better religions succeed, and the worse
ones go out of business. Friedrich Hayek, in familiar ways a disciple
of Smith, makes this claim. Hayek thought that the persistence of
customs conducive to social cooperation was closely tied to the
support those customs received from religion. Of course, not all
religions had this beneficent effect. "Among the founders of religions
over the last two thousand years, many opposed property and the
family. But the only religions that have survived are those which

250. Id. at 52.
251. Fleischacker, supra note 236, at 912.
252. Id. at 912-13.
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support property and the family."25' 3 The process by which the
pertinent selection occurred may have been invisible to those who
benefited from it. "Customs whose beneficial effects were unperceivable by those practising them were likely to be preserved long
enough to increase their selective advantage only when supported
by some other strong beliefs; and some powerful supernatural or
magic faiths were readily available to perform this role."25' 4 What
matters is that the customs that survived were the ones that
"influence [d] men to do what was required to maintain the structure
25
enabling them to nourish their enlarging numbers.""
It is clear what Hayek's notion of uncorrupted religion is: any set
of beliefs (whether they are true or false does not matter) that
enables people to engage, "peacefully though competitively, in
pursuing thousands of different ends of their own choosing in
collaboration with thousands of persons whom they will never
know."25 6 Hayek himself was an atheist who regarded the notion of
God as unintelligible;2 7 effects were all he cared about.
The dynamic of competition contemplated by Hayek is quite
unlike that of Madison or Smith, primarily because of Hayek's
evident reliance on the theories of Max Weber and Charles
Darwin.25 8 Weber argued that the early growth of capitalism in
Europe was facilitated by militant Calvinism, which promoted
rationality, calculating frugality, and the highly systematized
pursuit of profit.2 59 This, he thought, was why the most prosperous
parts of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were
Protestant ones: Holland, England, Brandenburg-Prussia, and the
Huguenot communities of France.2" Darwin thought that some
traits became more common in successive generations of organisms
253. 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK: THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF
SOCIALISM 137 (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988). Thanks to Max Schanzenbach for calling my
attention to this work.
254. Id. at 138.
255. Id. The evolutionary argument is further developed in 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 17-23 (1976).

256. HAYEK, supra note 253, at 135.
257. See id. at 139-40.
258. Darwin's influence on Hayek is noted in JOHN GRAY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY 31-33 (3d ed.
1998).
259. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott

Parsons trans., 1958) (1904).
260. See id.
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because those traits were more conducive to their carriers' survival
in a given environment.2 6 1 Hayek's model combined a Darwinian
model of competition with a Weberian model of the effect of some
religious ideas on economic behavior. Religions that promoted
economic cooperation, as early Protestantism did, were most likely
to survive and prosper.
Madison and Smith had a very different idea of the effects of
competition. They both thought that the factions themselves would
intentionally modify their behavior in the face of competition.
Darwin did not think that species intentionally evolved. Weber did
not think that the Calvinists were deliberately aiming at the
creation of a capitalist economy. For Hayek, cooperation-inducing
rules need not be adopted for that purpose: "Neither the groups who
first practised these rules, nor those who imitated them, need ever
have known why their conduct was more successful than that of
2 2
others, or helped the group persist.""
Hayek did not care about religion as such at all. He liked it
because he thought it was instrumentally good. He thus parted
company with both Madison and Smith.
2. Alexis de Tocqueville
A variant of the corruption argument holds that establishment
can only generate the kind of religion that people are likely to hold
in low regard. This argument was pressed during the election of
1800 by followers of Jefferson, who wanted to discourage Federalist
clergy from opposing Jefferson for his Deism.26 3 (As we just saw, it
was also anticipated by Hume, who, however, thought that the
decline of religious enthusiasm was a good thing and so supported
establishment.)
Here, the baseline against which corruption is measured is not
the Protestant one of personal communion with God, but simply
sincere religiosity, whatever its content. The argument thus is less
pervasively Protestant. But it continues to presume that religion is
a good thing, and that this good thing can be corrupted by state

261. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
262. HAYEK, supra note 255, at 21.
263. See HAMBURGER, supra note 70, at 130-32.
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sponsorship. The classic proponent of this argument was Alexis de
Tocqueville.
Tocqueville, writing at about the time that the last establishment
in America was being abandoned, thought that in the new egalitarian regime of the United States, the old feudal morality had
disappeared, and a pressing question was what kinds of morality
would take its place. The answer was that people would be motivated by "self-interest properly understood."2 They could be made
to understand that it was in their self-interest to do good and serve
their fellow creatures. The rational pursuit of self-interest would not
produce heroes, but it would shape "a lot of orderly, temperate,
moderate, careful, and self-controlled citizens. 2 65
Religion played a crucial role in bringing about this understanding. "The main business of religions is to purify, control, and restrain that excessive and exclusive taste for well-being which men
acquire in times of equality .266
Tocqueville was silent on the
theological issues, but he thought religious belief important to the
well-being of democracy. "How could society escape destruction if,
when political ties are relaxed, moral ties are not tightened? And
what can be done with a people master of itself if it is not subject to
God?"2 67
All religions, Tocqueville thought, had salutary social consequences:
Every religion places the object of man's desires outside and
beyond worldly goods and naturally lifts the soul into regions far
above the realm of the senses. Every religion also imposes on
each man some obligations toward mankind, to be performed in
common with the rest of mankind, and so draws him away, from
time to time, from thinking about himself. That is true even of
the most false and dangerous religions. 26
The American experience had taught that the best way to
promote religion was to keep the state away from it. Man is
264. ALEXIS DE TocQuEviLLE, DEMocRAcY IN AMERICA 526 (George Lawrence trans., J.P.
Mayer ed., 1969) (1835-40).
265. Id. at 527.
266. Id. at 448.
267. Id. at 294.
268. Id. at 444-45.
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naturally religious. Because "the incomplete joys of this world will
never satisfy his heart,"26' 9 he is naturally driven, by "an invincible
inclination,"'2 v toward contemplation of another world.
The "intellectual aberration"2 7' of unbelief had arisen in Europe,
Tocqueville thought, only because of establishment. Because
religion had become identified with a conservative politics, it
aroused the opposition of anyone who opposed the conservative
party. It thereby forfeited its natural strength:
As long as religion relies only upon the sentiments which are the
consolation of every affliction, it can draw the heart of mankind
to itself. When it is mingled with the bitter passions of this
world, it is sometimes constrained to defend allies who are such
from interest rather than from love; and it has to repulse as
adversaries men who still love religion, although they are
fighting against religion's allies. Hence religion cannot share the
material strength of the rulers without being burdened with
some of the animosity roused against them.272
This, Tocqueville thought, was why religious faith had withered
in Europe:
Unbelievers in Europe attack Christians more as political than
as religious enemies; they hate the faith as the opinion of a party
much more than as a mistaken belief, and they reject the clergy
less because they are the representatives of God than because
they are the friends of authority.273
In America, on the other hand, religion was powerful precisely
because it was not associated with any party. All the clergy with
269. Id. at 296.
270. Id.at 297.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 300-01. Contemporary scholarship agrees with Tocqueville's claims about the
reason for the decline of religion in Europe. See JOSE CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE
MODERN WORLD 27-29 (1994); Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 48-54. On the other hand,
establishment of an unusually oppressive kind has not diminished religiosity in Iran. In
response to a survey that asked whether respondents believed in God, 99 percent in Iran, 94
percent in the United States, and 56 percent in France said yes. STEVEN GOLDBERG,
BLEACHED FAITH: THE TRAGIC COST WHEN RELIGION IS FORCED INTO THE PUBLIC SQUARE 95
(2008).
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whom Tocqueville spoke during his visit to America agreed that "the
main reason for the quiet sway of religion over their country was the
complete separation of church and state. 274
Tocqueville agreed with Smith and Hume that sincere and enthusiastic religion was likely to be promoted by disestablishment,
and he insisted, even more than Smith, that religious enthusiasm
was likely to promote virtue. He was too sanguine, however, in his
275
suggestion that "even ... the most false and dangerous religions
could produce these valuable results. Marvin Zetterbaum observes
that Tocqueville's solution to the problem of how to make selfcentered people virtuous "lies in a simple extension of the principle
of self-interest to include the rewards of a future life. 276 But it
matters what those rewards are supposed to be rewards for. One
must look beyond narrow self-interest in order to be willing to fly an
airplane into a building.2 77 Steven Smith has observed that "we
cannot sensibly talk about the effects of 'religion' on character
because different forms of religion attempt to inculcate very
different character traits. 27 8 Whether religion is conducive to virtue
"also depends on the kind of virtues that a particular society chooses
to foster. 2 79 Tocqueville's vagueness on this point anticipated the
famous remark by Dwight Eisenhower that "[o]ur form of government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious
faith, and I don't care what it is."2 '
3. The FourteenthAmendment
Some mention must be made of the views of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, since it is by incorporation into that
274. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 264, at 295.
275. Id. at 445.
276. Marvin Zetterbaum, Alexis de Tocqueville, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 761,
778 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
277. On the psychological and sociological forces inherent in religion that sometimes
produce intolerance and persecution, see William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 843, 853-59 (1993).
278. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 30, at 102.
279. Id.
280. MARK SILK, SPIRITUAL PoLmCs: RELIGION AND AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR II 40

(1988). Less famously, Eisenhower made clear in the next sentence that he was not talking
about just any religion at all: "With us of course it is the Judeo-Christian concept but it must
be a religion that all men are created equal." Id.
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amendment that the Establishment Clause is applicable to the
states. The intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment with
respect to establishment is an important and not sufficiently studied
question. There is little helpful evidence. At best, it can be shown
that the corruption argument was still alive at this time, and
influenced courts in this period.
Kurt Lash has shown that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to apply the establishment norm to the
states. Freedom from established religion was understood to be
an aspect of individual freedom of conscience. "By 1868, the
(Non)Establishment Clause was understood to be a liberty as fully
capable of incorporation as any other provision in the first eight
amendments to the Constitution."28 '
Lash's article is the only sustained inquiry into the Fourteenth
Amendment framers's views on establishment. Lash does not make
much mention of the corruption argument. But he shows that it was
still a familiar part of the discourse of nonestablishment in the last
half of the nineteenth century. It was invoked by the Supreme Court
of Ohio in one of the first cases to cite the federal Establishment
Clause as a constraint on the states, the 1872 decision in Board of
Education v. Minor,282 which upheld a prohibition on religious
instruction in public schools. The court, invoking an idea of
competition more theologically loaded than Adam Smith's, declared
that religion would flourish under a broad hands-off doctrine:
Let the state not only keep its own hands off, but let it also see
to it that religious sects keep their hands off each other. Let
religious doctrines have a fair field, and a free, intellectual,
moral, and spiritual conflict. The weakest-that is, the intellectu-

281. Kurt Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the NonEstablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1154 (1995). For a similar view on the
incorporation question, see GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 14-15, 26-39. Lash's evidence has
been scandalously ignored by Justice Thomas as he has repeatedly claimed that the original
intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to incorporate establishment at

all. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,692-93 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Newdow v. Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. 1, 51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment);
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,677-80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). For further
discussion of Justice Thomas, see Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the
EstablishmentClause, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009).
282. 23 Ohio St. 211, 246 (1872), discussed in Lash, supra note 281, at 1125-31.
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ally, morally, and spirtually weakest-will go to the wall, and the
best will triumph in the end.2"

The Ohio court also was bold enough to distinguish true from
false Christianity:
True Christianity never shields itself behind majorities. Nero,
and the other persecuting Roman emperors, were amply
supported by majorities; and yet the pure and peaceable religion
of Christ in the end triumphed over them all; and it was only
when it attempted itself to enforce religion by the arm of
authority, that it began to wane. A form of religion that can not
live under equal and impartial laws ought to die, and sooner or
later must die. 2"

The U.S. Supreme Court did not go this far when it addressed the
establishment issue the year before in Watson v. Jones,2" in which
it rejected the "departure from doctrine" rule whereby courts could
award property to the faction most faithful to a church's religious
doctrines. But it did say that the state was an unreliable source of
religious doctrine:
It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be
as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all
these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their
own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more learned
tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one which is
less so."s
283. Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 250-51 (1872), quoted in Lash, supra note 281,
at 1129.
284. Id. at 247. This passage is not quoted in Lash's article; thanks to Kurt Lash for
bringing it to my attention. The court here echoes an argument from Madison, who argued
that:
[Tihe Christian Religion ... disavows a dependence on the powers of this world
.... [It is known that this Religion both existed and flourished, not only without
the support of human laws, but in spite of every opposition from them.
Madison, supra note 3, at 9.
285. 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
286. Id. at 729. A similar view is expressed in German Reformed Church v. Seibert, 3 Barr.
282, 291 (Pa. 1846) ("Any other than [ecclesiastical courts] must be incompetent judges of
matters of faith, discipline and doctrine; and civil courts, if they should be so unwise as to
attempt to supervise their judgments on matters which come within their jurisdiction, would
only involve themselves in a sea of uncertainty and doubt, which would do anything but
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These passages are suggestive, but they do not cohere into any
distinctive philosophy. Rather, they echo themes we have already
examined. They are, at best, evidence that the corruption arguments
remained part of the culture at the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was framed, and so offer some support to the idea that the incorporated Establishment Clause is influenced by an idea of corruption
at least somewhat like that which drove the original provision.
4. Hugo Black
The architect of modern Establishment Clause law is Justice
Hugo Black, who wrote the most important early opinions interpreting the Clause.2 87 Decisions authored by him declared that the
Establishment Clause was applicable to the states, 28 that a "released time" program in which religious instruction was offered in
the public schools was unconstitutional,28 9 that state officeholders
could not be required to profess a belief in God,2 "° and that stateauthored school prayers violated the Constitution.2 9'
The last of these contained the most explicit invocation of the
corruption rationale in any Supreme Court opinion, quoted more
fully above,2 92 which concluded with the declaration that "religion is
too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate., 29' According to one account, when Black
delivered the judgment of the Court, "his voice trembled with
emotion ...
as he paused over 'too personal, too sacred, too holy' ...
[a]nd he added extemporaneously, 'The prayer of each man from his
soul must be his and his alone.' 2 94 Three days after the decision was
announced, in a letter explaining his decision to a niece, Black
dismissed the idea that "prayer must be recited parrot-like in public

improve either religion or good morals."), quoted in Lash, supra note 281, at 1112 n.121.
287. The following discussion is heavily indebted to Dane, supra note 42, at 568-70.
288. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
289. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
290. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
291. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
292. See supra text accompanying note 62.
293. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431-32 (quoting MADISON, supra note 3, at 187).
294. ROGER K NEWMAN,HUGO BLAcK: A BIOGRAPHY 523 (2d ed. 1994).
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places in order to be effective," citing the passage of the Sermon on
the Mount that emphasizes the value of praying privately.29
Similarly strong language appears in his dissent in Zorach v.
29 6
Clauson:
Under our system of religious freedom, people have gone to their
religious sanctuaries not because they feared the law but
because they loved their God. The choice of all has been as free
as the choice of those who answered the call to worship moved
only by the music of the old Sunday morning church bells. The
spiritual mind of man has thus been free to believe, disbelieve,
or doubt, without repression, great or small, by the heavy hand
of government.297
The language of the holy and the sacred appears once again: "State
help to religion injects political and party prejudices into a holy
field.... Government should not be allowed, under cover of the soft
euphemism of 'co-operation,' to steal into the sacred area of religious
choice."29
Similar themes can be found in almost all of his Establishment
Clause opinions.2 99 He quoted with approval the religious antiestablishment arguments of Roger Williams, Jefferson, and Madison. 0 0
295. Id. at 523-24; Dane, supra note 42, at 569. He reportedly cited the same passage in
other correspondence concerning Engel. See MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE MEMOIRS OF
HUGO L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK 95 (1986). His son recalls him saying in response to the
protest against Engel: "Most of these people who are complaining, Son, are pure hypocrites
who never pray anywhere but in public for the credit of it. Prayer ought to be a private thing,
just like religion for a truly religious person." HUGO BLACK, JR., MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE
176 (1975).
Similar impatience with the rote recitation of words not felt is evident in a concurring
opinion he coauthored with Justice Douglas in West Virginia Boardof Educationv. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) ("Words uttered under coercion
are proof of loyalty to nothing but self-interest. Love of country must spring from willing
hearts and free minds ....
").
296. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
297. Id. at 319-20.
298. Id. at 320.
299. The exception is his concurrence inEpperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (Black,
J., concurring), in which he argued that a statute barring the teaching of evolution in the
public schools should be invalidated on grounds of vagueness rather than as an Establishment
Clause violation. He there suggested that, because both Darwin and the Bible were excluded
from the curriculum, it was arguable that the exclusion "leave[s] the State in a neutral
position toward these supposedly competing religious and anti-religious doctrines." Id. at 113.
300. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-34 (1962); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330
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On this basis he laid down the most fundamental Establishment
Clause restrictions, most of which remain unquestioned to this day:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation
between Church and State."3 °'
Repudiating the claim that his decisions manifested hostility to
religion, he wrote that "the First Amendment rests upon the
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere."' 2 He rejected a requirement that a Notary Public
profess a belief in God, because "[t]he power and authority of the
State of Maryland thus is put on the side of one particular sort of
believers-those who are willing to say they believe in 'the existence
of God."' 0 3 He then quoted an earlier opinion: '"[W] e have staked the
very existence of our country on the faith that complete separation
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1947).
301. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. He fought with Justice Felix Frankfurter over whether
this opinion ought to be cited in subsequent Supreme Court opinions. See JAMES F. SIMON,
THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN
AMERICA 180-83 (1989); Samuel A. Alito, Note, The "Released Time" Cases Revisited: A Study
of Group Decisionmaking by the Supreme Court, 83 YALE L.J. 1202, 1210-22 (1974). Black
repeated this entire passage inIllinois ex rel. McCollum v.Boardof Education,333 U.S. 203,
210-11 (1948), Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1961), and his dissent in Board of
Educationv.Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 250-51 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
302. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.
303. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490.
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between the state and religion is best for the state and best for
religion."3 4 He cited the old theme that establishment breeds
hypocrisy, arguing that the rule followed "the historically and constitutionally discredited policy of probing religious beliefs by test
oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more
properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious
concept."30 5 The school prayer decision declared that
the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an
establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country
it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part
of a religious program carried on by government.3 °6
Disestablishment meant that "the people's religions must not be
subjected to the pressures of government for change each time a
new political administration is elected to office."30 7 The Establishment Clause, Black claimed,
was written to quiet well-justified fears which nearly all of them
felt arising out of an awareness that governments of the past
had shackled men's tongues to make them speak only the
religious thoughts that government wanted them to speak and
to pray only to the God that government wanted them to pray
0
3

to.

Recent scholarship has emphasized Black's suspicion of the
Catholic church and his early involvement in the Ku Klux Klan as
evidence that modern Establishment Clause doctrine is contaminated with bias.30 9 Yet, the more important factor in explaining his
304. Id. at 494 (quoting McCollum, 333 U.S. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), which in
turn was quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
305. Id.
306. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
307. Id. at 430.
308. Id. at 435.
309. See HAMBURGER, supra note 70, at 422-34, 461-63; JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM
AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY 184-86 (2003); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT
AND AMERICAN POLITICS 182, 190, 368-69 (2000); Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and
Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 127-29 (2001). A different
psychological explanation is offered by Noah Feldman, who speculates that Black was
reacting to the atrocities of World War II. FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 173-75. Black was not
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approach to the Establishment Clause is that he was raised a
Baptist. By the time he wrote Engel, he was no longer formally
affiliated with any church s1° - he told his son, "I cannot believe. But
I can't not believe either."3 11-but he continued to hold a typically
Baptist view of the corrupting effects of establishment.3 1 2 The
corruption claim, as he states it in the passages just quoted, could
have been written by Backus or Leland.
A shrewder critique of Black was offered immediately after
Everson and McCollum by the Catholic theologian John Courtney
Murray.3 13 Murray argued that the idea of separation that underlay
these decisions
depended on "a particular sectarian concept of
'religion.' 3 4 The idea that religion is a fundamentally private and
individual matter, one that can never be expressed in communal
ritual, depends, Murray argued, on "a deistic version of fundamentalist Protestantism."" 5 The idea of an absolute ban on assistance
to religion "even in the demonstrable absence of any coercion of
conscience, any inhibition of full religious liberty, any violation of
31
civil equality, any disruption of social harmony""
cannot be
sustained without this religious premise, he thought. Responding to
Justice Rutledge's claim that separation "is best for the state and
best for religion, 31 7 he asked: "[B]y what constitutional authority is
the Supreme Court empowered to legislate as to what is 'best for
religion'? I thought church and state were separated here. 31 8
innocent of anti-Catholic bigotry. There is no excuse for his dissent in Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 250-54 (1968), which hysterically claims that Catholic schools seeking to
borrow textbooks from the state are 'looking toward complete domination and supremacy of
their particular brand of religion." Id. at 251.
310. He occasionally attended services at a Unitarian church. NEWMAN, supra note 294, at
521.
311. See BLACK, supra note 295, at 172.
312. He also had a typically Baptist view of the primacy of individual conscience, which is
apparent in his plurality opinion in Welsh v.United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), in which he
held that even those who did not believe in God could claim a religious exemption from the
draft. He wrote that the law "exempts from military service all those whose consciences,
spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace
if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war." Id. at 344.
313. See Murray, supra note 4.
314. Id. at 29.
315. Id. at 31.
316. Id. at 30.
317. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 59 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
318. Murray, supra note 4, at 30 n.33.
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Murray was on shakier ground when he claimed that "Madison's
radically individualistic concept of religion" was "today quite
passe. ' 3 9
The problem about the religious roots of the corruption argument
is nonetheless a pressing one, and for just the reason that Murray
notes. A rule against establishment of religion ought not itself to
establish a religion. The point is a powerful one, and it is remarkable that so little has been made of it since Murray wrote.
IV. THE TROUBLESOME RELIGIOUS ROOTS

Now that we have examined the argument for corruption as it
was deployed by the founding generation, we can ask whether any
of this matters for contemporary constitutional interpretation. It is
clear that the corruption argument mattered to the Framers, and
that they thought that preventing corruption of religion was one of
the purposes of barring establishments of religion. Can that offer us
any guidance in interpreting the Clause today?
The role of original meaning is contested in constitutional law.
But it is generally agreed that, when a provision is aimed at a
specific historical evil, the provision should be read as preventing a
recurrence of that evil or others relevantly like it. Of course, there
is room for disagreement as to what counts as other evils relevantly
like it. For that, we have to look at what the problem is and offer an
account of why it makes sense to remedy it. For such an account, the
original meaning will not help us. The prohibition rarely arrives
with a rule for its interpretation, and often the Framers had no
specific interpretive rule in mind. 2 ' When the authors of the
First Amendment condemned establishment, Thomas Curry notes,
"they had in their minds an image of tyranny, not a definition of a
system."32 '
319. Id. at 29 n.29.
320. Thus, for example, Leonard Levy has shown that, at the time of the framing of the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, neither James Madison nor almost anyone else
had figured out that the protection of free speech must prevent the state from punishing
seditious libel, even though this core meaning of the Clause would shortly be argued by
Madison in his critique of the Sedition Act a few years later. LEVY, supra note 73.
321. See CURRY, supra note 71, at 211. The Court has similarly observed that the purpose
of the Framers of the First Amendment "was to state an objective[,] not to write a statute."
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
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Jed Rubenfeld has observed that constitutional interpretation is
frequently guided by paradigm cases, which are specific core
commitments that are memorialized by the constitutional provisions. An example is the Fourteenth Amendment.3 2' The Amendment's language is broad, but it was enacted specifically to outlaw
the Black Codes-laws enacted by white-controlled legislatures
after the Civil War, that imposed specific legal disabilities on
blacks, such as requiring them to be gainfully employed under
contracts of long duration, excluding them from occupations other
than manual labor, and disabling them from testifying against
whites in court."' Any plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment must invalidate the Black Codes. More generally, any
interpretation that specifies the more general types of inequality
that the Amendment forbids must be a chain of inferences from the
core commitment represented by the paradigm case. 24
Similarly with other constitutional provisions that are aimed at
specific evils. The Fourth Amendment's 2 5 ban on unreasonable
searches and seizures should be read in light of the controversies
over general searches and writs of assistance before the American
Revolution. 6 The contract clause should be read as a response to
debtor relief legislation in the 1780s.32 7 If original meaning is to
count at all, then a constitutional provision must be understood to
address the very problem that it was designed to address.
Unless a constitutional provision states a specific rule, it must be
understood to stand for some principle. That principle must be a
principle that addresses the very problem that the provision was
designed to address. But it cannot simply be a rule that addresses
that problem and nothing more. If the Framers had intended to do
that, then they could have said so, and they did not.
322. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
323. See generally THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965).
324. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT 178-195 (2001). The idea that constitutional provisions should be interpreted
in light of paradigm cases is, of course, hardly original with Rubenfeld. See, e.g., Douglas
Laycock, Text, Intent, and the Religion Clauses,4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 683,
690 (1990). Rubenfeld lays out the argument with unusual clarity and detail.
325. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
326. See JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 32-33 (2005).
327. Laycock, supra note 324, at 690.
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The Establishment Clause is a particularly apt candidate for
paradigm case interpretation because the core historical wrong that
was intended to be barred-here, an establishment of religion of the
kind that existed in England-is specifically named in the text.32
Paradigm case reasoning proceeds by "extrapolating general
principles from the foundational paradigm cases and applying those
principles to the controversy at hand." '29 With respect to provisions
such as the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which prohibit
certain government actions, the general principle should give a
convincing account of the result in the paradigm case while at the
same time properly specifying the kind of evil that the prohibition
reaches. The principle should explain what kind of wrong the
provision is prohibiting, so that in subsequent controversies, it is
possible to tell whether the same kind of wrong is or is not occurring.
In Establishment Clause cases, then, to the extent that one wants
to rely on original meaning-and I am by no means suggesting that
this should be the sole source of constitutional law3S--one should
ask, (1) why did the Framers think establishment of religion is a
bad thing, and (2) is the same bad thing brought about by the
challenged action in this case? There will obviously be room for
disagreement about both of these issues. The paradigm case method
does not decide cases, but it makes clear which questions the judges
should ask.
With respect to the first question, why the Framers thought
establishment was a bad thing, the corruption argument is indisputably relevant. It was only one of the reasons why establishment was
thought bad, but it was a consideration that played an important
role, and so the Clause should be read in light of it.
The original argument about corruption cannot be used today
without modification. In its original form, it is crucially dependent
on Protestant or Deist premises. Today, Deism has disappeared, and

328. Rubenfeld briefly discusses the interpretation of the Establishment Clause in
RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY, supra note 326, at 29-30.
329. See RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME, supra note 324, at 191.
330. Original meaning is more conventionally taken to be one of several sources of
constitutional meaning, along with text, precedent, and much else. The classic catalogue of
sources of constitutional law is PHILIP BOBBI'r, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982).
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the largest religious denomination in the United States is Catholicism."' More generally, an interpretation of the Establishment
Clause that relies on specific, contested theological premises is
inconsistent with the purpose of the Clause. The trouble is that the
corruption argument has a paradoxical and potentially self-nullifying quality: the corruption claim can always be applied to the
understanding of religion that is the basis for any specific corruption
claim. So, in order to be usable now, the argument will need some
translation.
To begin this exercise in reconstruction, let us enumerate the
recurring claims that fall under the rubric of "corruption."
A. The Claims Distilled
Religious behavior, without sincerity, is devoid of religious value.
From this premise some, but hardly all, commentators have inferred
that the religion that the state can promote is likely to be worthless.
The idea that religious sincerity is crucial to salvation, and that one
should follow one's own conscientious beliefs even in the teeth of
contrary religious authority, was endorsed as early as Pope Innocent
III (1198-1216): 'One ought to endure excommunication rather than
sin ...
no one ought to act against his own conscience and he should
follow his conscience rather than the judgment of the church when
he is certain ...
one ought to suffer any evil rather than sin against
conscience.' 3 32 Noah Feldman observes that the idea of freedom of
conscience is already being suggested by this kind of argument: "If
it was sinful to act against conscience, then there might be reason
to avoid requiring anyone to act against conscience."' But here it
is only inchoate. Aquinas, who held basically the same view as
Innocent, did not suggest that conscience entailed religious toleration. On the contrary, he supported the persecution of heretics.3 34
331. This is why modern defenders of nonestablishment cannot simply invoke the original
religious arguments to defend their position. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton & Rachel Steamer,
The Religious Originsof DisestablishmentPrinciples,81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1755 (2006).
332. Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: An Historical Perspective, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 17, 25 (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996)
(quoting ORDINARY GLOSS TO THE DECRETALS (explaining two judgments by Innocent)).
333. Noah Feldman, The IntellectualOrigins of the EstablishmentClause,77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
346, 357 (2002).
334. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON PRINCELY GOVERNMENT, in AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL
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The present populations of South America and Africa are ample
evidence that state coercion can eventually bring about many
people's sincere adherence to the favored religious belief. Additional
premises appear to be necessary in order for this argument to be a
constraint on state power.
Establishment exaggerates the importance of doctrinaldivisions.
In fact, a variety of religious positions have religious value. Stateinduced religious uniformity, therefore, attacks the very value it
seeks to promote. This goes beyond Aquinas because it holds that
heresy is not a harm against which the state can legitimately
protect the public. It may not be a harm at all. This may be because
the theological differences at issue are not really that important. Or,
it may be because the differences that are likely to bother the state
are unlikely to be the ones that matter, or even that the state is
likely to promote the wrong views, as Milton, Locke, and Madison
argued. It may be that false religious views have positive value
because engagement with them brings us closer to the truth, as
Milton, Pufendorf, and Jefferson thought. This claim also supports
the next argument.
The state is an unreliable source of religious authority. In part,
this follows from the above argument. To those who have been
on the losing side of state-imposed uniformity, it is also an inference
from experience. Note, however, that because the corruption argument is itself religious, it has inherent limits: the state evidently is
not so unreliable that it cannot discern religious value when that
value is described at this level of abstraction. In order to make any
use at all of the corruption argument, the state must be competent
to say what is religious.
Religious teachings are likely to be altered, in a pernicious way,
if the teachers are agents of the state. This can be derived from
WRITINGS 3, 77-79 (J.G. Dawson trans., A.P. D'Entreves ed., 1981). There is some tension
within this position, as the heretic may be exercising his own rational faculties to the best of
his ability. Aquinas found it necessary to deny this, and to claim that the heretic is willfully
denying the truth. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 87-88
(1986). "Aquinas did not make clear whether he believed that a well informed conscience could
ever be in conflict with ecclesiastical authority." MICHAEL G. BAYLOR, ACTION AND PERSON:
CONSCIENCE IN LATE SCHOLASTICISM AND THE YOUNG LUTHER 57 n. 138 (1977). Contemporary
Catholicism takes a very different view. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE [DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM] (1965) declares the right of individuals to seek the truth in religious matters, even
if they follow false religions.
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theological premises, as in the writings of Roger Williams.3 35 It may
also be an inference from experience, but if it is, then it presupposes
some idea of what it means for a change in religion to be pernicious.
That idea cannot be religiously neutral.
Establishment tends to produce undeserved contempt toward
religion. This, too, is an inference from experience. It is, however,
theologically controversial in that it rejects the view, which some
people hold, that religion as such deserves contempt.
The legitimate authority of the state does not extend to religious
questions. This can be derived from a kind of social contract
argument, and Locke so derived it in an argument independent of
his theological arguments. But it also follows from the above
argument.
All of these arguments depend on some conception of the good of
religion, which disestablishment protects from corruption. What
could such a conception look like today? It is clear what it cannot be:
an unmediated connection with God arrived at through personal
study of the New Testament, as Milton and Elisha Williams wrote,
and many of the other writers we have surveyed may have thought.
What could take its place?
B. Scalia's Reformulation
As Jared Goldstein has observed, a rule that the state may not
examine the merits of religious practices and beliefs depends on the
premise that the state can tell what religion is. Otherwise, it is
impossible to follow the rule." 6 But the discernment of what religion
is itself appears to present a religious question. The problem
becomes more acute once it is noted that the corruption argument
depends on the premise that religion is a good thing. Then, we have
to ask, what is this good thing? Is it possible to answer that question
without committing oneself on controversial religious questions?
335. See supra Part III.A.2.
336. See Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a 'Religious Question"Doctrine?JudicialAuthority
To Examine Religious Practicesand Beliefs, 54 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 497 (2005). The same
analytic point is made in another context by David Strauss, who shows that a colorblindness
rule is necessarily intensely race-conscious. David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness,
1986 SUP. CT. REV. 199. For engagement with Goldstein's arguments, see Andrew Koppelman,
The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 865 (2009).
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Larry Alexander argues that, if religion is accommodated because
it is a good thing, then one should only accommodate the true
religion."' If duties to God have priority over duties to the state,
then this priority only holds with respect to real, rather than
imagined, duties to God.33 s In order to apply this rationale, the state
would have to decide what the true religion is and to exempt only
that religion's believers from generally applicable laws.33 s In the
context of the corruption argument, a variation on Alexander's claim
would be that the state should figure out which religious beliefs fall
within the range of neighboring differences that have religious
value, and then keep its hands off only those beliefs. That was the
position of all the proponents of disestablishment who drew the line
at certain religious beliefs that they thought were obviously false
and destructive, such as atheism or Catholicism.34 °
Something like this formulation has been proposed by Justice
Antonin Scalia. He offers his approach as a solution to the free
exercise/establishment dilemma. "We have not yet come close to
reconciling [the requirement that government not advance religion]
34 1
and our Free Exercise cases, and typically we do not really try."
The solution he, Justice Thomas, and the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist proposed would impose dramatic limits upon the
Establishment Clause. They would read the Clause only to prohibit
favoritism among sects, while permitting states to favor religion
over irreligion. Of this group, Scalia has offered the clearest
formulation of the alternative rule: "[Olur constitutional tradition
... ruled out of order government-sponsored endorsement of religion
... where the endorsement is sectarian, in the sense of specifying
details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent,
omnipotent Creator and Ruler of 34the
world are known to differ (for
2
Christ.)"
of
divinity
example, the

337. See Larry Alexander, Good God, Garvey! The Inevitability and Impossibility of a
Religious Justificationof Free Exercise Exemptions, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 35, 39-41 (1998).
338. See id.
339. See id.
340. See AREOPAGITICA, supra note 74, at 747; LOCKE, supra note 121, at 50; WILLIAMS,
supra note 142, at 93.
341. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 617 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
342. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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More recently, in McCreary County v. ACLU,343 dissenting from
a decision barring one ceremonial display of the Ten Commandments, he frankly acknowledged that ceremonial theism would
entail "contradicting the beliefs of some people that there are many
gods, or that God or the gods pay no attention to human affairs. 34 4
The Commandments "are assuredly a religious symbol, but they are
not so closely associated with a single religious belief that their
display can reasonably be understood as preferring one religious
sect over another. The Ten Commandments are recognized by
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam alike as divinely given. 34 5 Justice
Stevens objected that "[t]here are many distinctive versions of the
Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even different
denominations within a particular faith; to a pious and learned
observer, these differences may be of enormous religious significance."'346 Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, Thomas, and Kennedy,
retorted that "[t]he sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is
not widely known. I doubt that most religious adherents are even
aware that there are competing versions with doctrinal consequences (I certainly was not)." Justice Scalia thus envisions a role
for the Court in which it decides which articles of faith are sufficiently widely shared to be eligible for state endorsement (and in
which determinedly uneducable judicial ignorance is a source of
law!). Evidently, according to Justice Scalia, the state may endorse
any religious proposition so long as that proposition is (or is
believed to be by a judge unacquainted with doctrinal niceties) a
matter of agreement between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It
would, for instance, be permissible for the state to declare that
Gabriel is one of the most important archangels. The interpretation
of the Establishment Clause would then depend on the further
343. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
344. Id. at 893 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 909. There is a delicious ambiguity, which I will not pursue further here, about
what it means to be "associated with a single religious belief." Id. If the Ten Commandments
are not so associated, then neither is the divinity of Christ, as Protestants and Catholics who
violently disagree on many religious issues are nonetheless in agreement about that.
346. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 717-18 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Steven Lubet, The Ten Commandments in Alabama, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 471, 474-476
(1998)).
347. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 909 n.12 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., and
Thomas, J., dissenting).
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development of the Muslim idea of the People of the Book-those
who have received a revelation that is deemed (formerly by the
Koran, now by the Supreme Court) to be reliably from God.
Like Backus or Adams, Scalia's vision of state incompetence is
limited only to certain theological propositions. The state must not
adjudicate the divinity of Christ. But it is only disagreement among
monotheists that the state must keep its hands off. It can authoritatively and reliably pronounce its views on the question of theism. 4 8
Scalia's solution will not work because it discriminates among
religions. Chief Justice Rehnquist thought that the Establishment
Clause forbids "asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over others." '4 9 Scalia once agreed: "I have always
believed, and all my opinions are consistent with the view, that the
Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion over
others."3 5 Not all religions involve a belief in "a benevolent,
omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world." '51 Scalia's formulation
does discriminate among religions. Christians, Jews, and Muslims
are in; Hindus, Buddhists, and atheists are out. The outs are a lot
of people. Justice Scalia defended his approach by noting that
the monotheistic religions "combined account for 97.7% of all

348. For a similar criticism of the nonpreferentialist position, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 616-18 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). A defender of Scalia might say that there is a
difference between saying that the state can discern the broadest religious truths (probably
Locke's position about atheism) and saying, as Scalia does, that the state can discern a
consensus or historical tradition and act to reflect the consensus view. As the development
of Scalia's position makes clear, this distinction is unsustainable in practice.
"Acknowledgement" easily slides into endorsement. Thanks to Kent Greenawalt for pressing
me on this point.
349. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
350. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 748 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
351. The Court held long ago that the Establishment Clause forbids government to "aid
those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on
different beliefs." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). The Court noted that "[a]mong
religions in this country, which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in
the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others."
Id. at 495 n.11. To say that Buddhism rejects theism is something of an overstatement.
Although the historical Buddha had no interest in theological questions, some forms of
Buddhism make theological claims, sometimes assigning divine status to Buddha himself. For
a general overview of these issues, see Masao Abe, Buddhism, in OUR RELIGIONS 69-137
(Arvind Sharma ed., 1993). Hinduism is only the most prominent of many polytheistic
religions. There are, concededly, monotheistic interpretations of Hinduism, but not all Hindus
subscribe to these.
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believers."35' 2 But he is fudging the numbers. In calculating the level
of exclusion here, nonbelievers are doubly excluded, as they are not
even entitled to be part of the denominator. If one adds the nonbelievers, as enumerated in the 2004 Statistical Abstract of the United
States that Scalia cites, the excluded adult population is 33 million
out of 207 million, or 16 percent.35 3
The numbers are in fact a bit more complicated than the Statistical Abstract suggests. The proportion of Americans who report
having no religious preference doubled in the 1990s, from 7 percent
in 1991 (which had been its level for almost twenty years) to 14
percent in 1998. 354 However, most of the members of this category
are in fact religious. More than half believe in God, more than half
believe in life after death, about a third believe in heaven and hell,
and 93 percent sometimes pray. 355 The most careful study of this
group concludes that the newer members of this group are mostly
"unchurched believers" who declare no religious preference in an
effort to express their distance from the Religious Right.35 6
It is pretty clear that these people are not interested in being part
of the theistic triumphalism that Scalia wants to license. Similarly,
Steven Gey observes that, in order to calculate the number of people
excluded from Scalia's formula, one ought also to include the large
number of theists who reject state sponsorship of religion, including
"[t]raditional Roger Williams-style Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, most Jews, many Presbyterians, and
other modern nonfundamentalist Protestants. 35 7 Scalia does not
explain his indifference to these people, although he conspicuously
includes Jews and Muslims, who together comprise fewer than 4
million Americans.35 8
352. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
353. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTIcAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005, 55

tbl.67 (124th ed. 2004), cited in McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Further
data on the number of people Scalia is leaving out are compiled in Frederick Mark Gedicks
& Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo-Christianityand the Ten Commandments, 110 W.
VA. L. REV. 275, 284-85 (2007). The data on which the Census Bureau relies is described in
detail in BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, RELIGION IN A FREE MARKET (2006).
354. Michael Hout & Claude S. Fischer, Why More Americans Have No Religious
Preference: Politics and Generations, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 165, 165 (2002).
355. Id. at 178-79.
356. Id. at 165, 179.
357. Gey, supra note 33, at 20.
358. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 353, at 55 tbl.67. As Gey notes, most Jews are

2009]

CORRUPTION OF RELIGION

1903

Scalia's position is essentially that the state may take one side in
the modern culture wars, in favor of traditionalists and against
modernists. It may not be irrelevant that the traditionalists have
become an important constituency of the Republican party." 9 This
kind of religious division, with the coercive power of the state as the
prize for which the religious factions struggle, is one of the central
evils that the religion clauses are aimed at preventing. One may
also wonder why Scalia thinks that the state's competence extends
to this particular set of religious questions when he concedes its
incompetence with respect to so many others.
Perhaps Scalia's central aim is to promote a certain kind of civic
unity, which recognition of religion makes possible. This is clearest
in his dissent from a decision invalidating a high school graduation
prayer:
The Founders of our Republic knew the fearsome potential of
sectarian religious belief to generate civil dissension and civil
strife. And they also knew that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so
inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a
toleration-no, an affection-for one another than voluntarily
joining in prayer together, to the God whom they all worship and
seek. Needless to say, no one should be compelled to do that, but
it is a shame to deprive our public culture of the opportunity,
and indeed the encouragement, for people to do it voluntarily.
The Baptist or Catholic who heard and joined in the simple and
inspiring prayers of Rabbi Gutterman on this official and
patriotic occasion was inoculated from religious bigotry and
prejudice in a manner that cannot be replicated. To deprive our
separationists who are not interested in being included in Scalia's numerator. Gey, supra note
33, at 20.
359. See GEOFFREY LAYMAN, THE GREAT DIVIDE: RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL CONFLICT IN
AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS 12 (2001); WUTHNOW, supra note 44, at 218-22. The effect has
become more pronounced over time. In the 2004 presidential election, those who attended
church more than once a week voted for Bush by a margin of 65 percent to 35 percent,
whereas those who never attended church were almost the inverse: 36 percent to 62 percent.
See Jay Lefkowitz, The Election, and the Jewish Vote, COMMENTARY, Feb. 2005, at 61, 64.
Among Orthodox Jews, 69 percent voted for Bush, whereas Conservative Jews gave him 23
percent and Reform Jews 15 percent. Id. Bush won 40 percent of the votes of Jews attending
synagogue on a weekly basis, compared to 18 percent of those who rarely or never attend. Id.
It may also be relevant that the "originalist" credentials of Scalia's position are deeply
flawed, suggesting that he is basing his position on something other than the intentions of the
Framers. See Koppelman, supra note 281.
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society of that important unifying mechanism, in order to spare
the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of
standing or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation, is as
senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law."e
Social unity, he evidently thinks, depends on shared norms.
The problem with Scalia's prescription of official monotheism is
that Baptists and Catholics and Jews can indeed be part of the
overlapping consensus he contemplates, but we live in a society that
also includes millions who are not monotheists.3 6 Charles Taylor's
point about the limitations of a common ground strategy is salient
here.36 2 If the aim is shared agreement, then it is counterproductive
to propose unifying principles to which large numbers of citizens
cannot possibly agree. The size of the remainder matters. Perhaps
Scalia's solution made sense in the 1950s when the idea of a "JudeoChristian" overlapping consensus was invented," 3 but it is no longer
appropriate in contemporary American society. 3" Overlapping
consensus is unstable and constantly under construction.
Scalia is right, however, about the importance of shared norms.
A sense of solidarity is indispensable to democracy: if majorities
are to rule legitimately, then the losers need to feel that they have
some stake in the system. A sense of solidarity is also necessary to
a functioning welfare state. The split between American liberals
and the religious has greatly truncated the possibilities for a
transformative left politics.3 65
As the common ground shrinks, however, its basis must become
more abstract and vague. Christianity will no longer do the job.
Neither will monotheism. But the idea that religion is something of
value, and that that value is jeopardized when religious questions
are adjudicated by the state, may continue to provide the common
ground that is needed.
The pluralism we now face was not imagined by the Framers. It
is therefore impossible to attribute to them any view about it.
360.
361.
(2008).
362.
363.
364.
365.

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
U.S. CENSUSBUREAU, STATIsTICALABsTRAcT OFTHE UNITED STATES: 2008, at 59 tbl.74
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See SILK, supra note 280, at 40-53.
See generally Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 353.
See GARRY WILiS, UNDER GOD: REuGION AND AMERIcAN POLITIcs 106-07 (1990).
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Protestant Christianity was so pervasive in their culture that they
did not even consider whether its establishment was inconsistent
with religious liberty."' Modern religious pluralism has generated
new knowledge about the range of religious issues that are potentially subject to corruption by state interference.

V. A PROPOSAL
A. Defining Religion
What, then, is the "religion" that the state must keep its hands
off in order to avoid corrupting it? Religion is a category that is hard
to delimit. 6 7 The best treatments of the problem of defining "religion" for constitutional purposes, most prominently that of Kent
Greenawalt, have concluded that no dictionary definition will do
because no single feature unites all the things that are indisputably
religions.s Religions just have a "family resemblanc[e]" to one
another. 6 9 In doubtful cases, one can only ask how close the analogy
is between a putative instance of religion and the indisputable
instances.37 °
366. Laycock, supra note 229, at 918-19; CURRY, supra note 71, at 218, 221.
367. Many writers have tried to evade this problem by saying that what isto be protected
is not religion, but conscience. The reasons why this stratagem will not work are explored in
Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
368. Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753,
762-63 (1984).
369. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 20 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
3d ed. 1958).
370. See GREENAWALT, supra note 55, at 124-25, 137-42; Greenawalt, supra note 368, at
761-63, 767-68; see also TRIBE, supra note 28, at 1181-83; George C. Freeman, III, The

Misguided Search for the ConstitutionalDefinition of 'Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1520,
1553, 1556 (1983); William P. Alston, Religion, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 140,
142 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967); Koppelman, supra note 7, at 125-39; Eduardo Pefialver, Note,
The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 794, 814-16 (1997). Courts in Europe have done
no better in devising a definition. REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 110-26 (2005). Indeed, it appears that no jurisdiction in the world has
managed to solve this problem. See T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the
Definition of 'Religion" in InternationalLaw, 16 HARV.HUM. RTS. J. 189 (2003). Lest one
think that the neo-Wittgensteinian approach advocated here is an artifact of academic
preciousness, note that an analogical criterion is also used by that singularly hardheaded
entity, the Internal Revenue Service. See Defining 'Religious Organization"and "Church,"
868 EST., GIFTS & TR. PORTFOLIOS (BNA) ch. III (2007), available at http'J/taxandaccounting.

1906

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1831

This process need not yield indeterminacy. The concept of "family
resemblance" is drawn from the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein,
who famously argued that "the meaning of a word is its use in the
language."3 7' Thus, for example, there is no single thing common to
"games" which makes them all games, but "similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that."3. 2 The use of the word
"game" is thus not circumscribed by any clear rule. But that does
not mean that it is not circumscribed at all. "[N]o more are there
any rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard;
'
yet tennis is a game for all of that and has rules too."373
Explaining Wittgenstein's idea here, Charles Taylor observes
that, with respect to a great many rule-guided social practices,
the "rule" lies essentially in the practice. The rule is what is
animating the practice at any given time, and not some formulation behind it, inscribed in our thoughts or our brains or our
genes, or whatever. That's why the rule is, at any time, what the
practice has made it.'74
The rules of appropriate comportment when riding on a bus, for
instance, are not codified anywhere. But natives of the culture may
understand quite well what they are, and there may be no doubt at
all as to how they apply in particular cases, even if they have not
been codified and could not be codified.37 5
bna.com/btac/.
The vagueness of this approach avoids the difficulty, nicely delineated by Christopher L.
Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, that it would be paradoxical and self-defeating for a
conception of religious liberty to depend on choosing among contested conceptions of what is
religious. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What Religion Is?,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807 (2009).
371. WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 369, at 20.
372. Id. at 31.
373. Id. at 33.
374. CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 178 (1995).
375. See AL YANKoVic, ANOTHER ONE RIDES THE BUS (Placebo Records 1981).
Jonathan Z. Smith has observed that the term "religion" denotes an anthropological
category, arising out of a particular Western practice of encountering and accounting for
foreign belief systems associated with geopolitical entities with which the West was forced to
deal. Jonathan Z. Smith, Religion, Religions, Religious, in CRiIcAL TERMS FOR RELIGIOUS
STUDIES 269,269, 275,281 (Mark C. Taylor ed., 1998). Arising thus out of a specific historical
situation, and evolving in unpredictable ways thereafter, "religion" would be surprising if it
had any essential denotation.
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The definition of religion in American law appears to work just
this way. There is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that
will make something a "religion." But it is remarkable how few
cases have arisen in which courts have had real difficulty in
determining whether something is a religion.376
In the context of the hands-off rule, religion should be understood
by reference to a set of ultimate questions that the state must not
try to answer. But the state can recognize and promote the good of
religion, understood at a certain level of abstraction.37 7 Neutrality
is fluid; it is available in many specifications.3 7 The American
approach is one defensible specification. The state is agnostic about
religion, but it is an interested and sympathetic agnosticism. The
state does not say, "I don't know and you don't either." Rather, it
declares the value of religion in a carefully noncommittal way: "It
would be good to find out. And we encourage your efforts to do that."
The precise character of the good being promoted is itself
deliberately left vague because the broad consensus on freedom of
religion would surely collapse if we had to state with specificity the
value promoted by religion. "Religion" denotes a cluster of goods,
including salvation (if you think you need to be saved), harmony
379
with the transcendent origin of universal order (if it exists),
responding to the fundamentally imperfect character of human life
(ifit is imperfect),8 0 courage in the face of the heartbreaking aspects
of human existence (if that kind of encouragement helps),3"' a
transcendent underpinning for the resolution to act morally (if that
kind of underpinning helps),3 82 contact with that which is awesome
376. The list of reported cases that have had to determine a definition of "religion" is a
remarkably short one. See Religion, 36C WORDS AND PHRASES 153-57 (2002 & Supp. 2008).
A recent survey laments the absence of a clear definition, but offers no evidence that the
courts have had any trouble deciding cases as a result. Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note,
Constitutional"Religion" A Survey of FirstAmendment Definitionsof Religion, 6 TEX. J. C.L.
& C.R. 117 (2001).
377. Koppelman, supra note 7, at 133-38.
378. See Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. POLITICS 633 (2004).
379. JOHN M. FINNIs, NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTS 89-90 (1980).
380. KEITHE.YANDELL, PHILOSOPHYOFRELIGION:ACONTEMPORARYINTRODUCTION

17,32-

34 (1999).
381. PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE To BE 155-56, 163-73 (1952).
382. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge University Press 1997) (1788); IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF
REASON ALONE (Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., Harper & Row 1960) (1794).
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and indescribable (if awe is something you feel), 83 and many others.
No general description of the good that religion seeks to promote can
be satisfactory, politically or intellectually." The Establishment
Clause permits the state to favor religion so long as "religion" is
understood very broadly, forbidding any discrimination or preference among religions or religious propositions.
This understanding makes it possible to defend accommodations
without running into the free exercise/establishment dilemma. The
state is recognizing the value of religion, but it is making no claims
about religious truth. It is the making of such claims that violates
the Establishment Clause.
This understanding also provides a basis for the hands-off rule.
Each of these understandings of the good of religion is manipulable
for political purposes. Each is likely to be abused. There is no reason
to trust the state to resolve religious questions. The incompetence
and futility extend to the deepest religious divisions today. Recall
the basic elements of the claim that establishment corrupts religion.
Religious behavior, without sincerity, is devoid of religious
value. 85 Each of the understandings of the good of religion that I
have described at least has a personal dimension, even if it also has
communal aspects. So, hypocrisy is a ubiquitous worry, and state
efforts to nudge citizens toward a particular religious view produces
hypocrisy. Of course, the nudge may be gentle, and if it is gentle
enough, it is unlikely to produce this particular pathology and may
be quite effective. 8 6 So, this argument needs supplementation if it
is to support as broad a hands-off rule as the Court has adopted.

383. RUDOLF Oi'TO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY 12-24 (2d ed. 1950).
384. Charles Taylor has stated the difficulties for any general theory of religion:
I doubt very much whether any such general theory can even be established. I
mean a theory which can gather all the powerful 6lans and aspirations which
humans have manifested in the spiritual realm, and relate them to some single
set of underlying needs or aims or tendencies (whether it be the desire for
meaning or something else). The phenomena are much too varied and baffling
for that; and even if they were more tractable, we would have to stand at the end
of history to be able to draw such conclusions.
CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 679 (2007).
385. See supra p.18 9 6.
386. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
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Establishment exaggerates the importance of doctrinaldivisions.
8 7 This
In fact, a variety of religiouspositions have religious value."
follows from the premise that everything in the cluster should be
treated as participating in the value of religion. The cluster conception of religion is essentially pluralistic. Some religions reject
this premise, of course. But their adherents may nonetheless be
persuaded that religious liberty will be more secure if the state is
required to act as though this premise were true.
The stateis an unreliablesource of religious authority."'8 Religious
teachings are likely to be altered, in a pernicious way, if the teachers
are agentsof the state.3" 9 Establishmenttends to produce undeserved
contempt toward religion."°
All of these may be treated as inferences from experience. The
most notable datum that has presented itself since the framing is
the frequently noted fact that in Europe, with its established
churches, religion is withering away; in the United States, it is
thriving.3 91 One may also note the unattractive ways in which
religion is transformed when the state tries to embrace it in a
politically acceptable way. Steven Goldberg's book Bleached Faith9 2
does this in some detail, noting that when the state displays the Ten
Commandments, it typically does so in forms that deprive it of any
meaning; that the movement to teach "intelligent design" in the
schools demotes God to the status of a second-rate engineer of
biological minutiae; that the promotion of Christmas produces a
bland, commercialized Christianity while distorting the place of
Hanukkah in the Jewish calendar. These examples have limited
power because they will move some people more than others. All the
argument needs to be effective, however, is for audiences to be able
to think of some illustrations of these propositions.
The legitimate authority of the state does not extend to religious
questions.9 3 This follows from all of the above. It entails a hands-off
rule with respect to theological questions. Implicit in the hands-off
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

See supra p.1 8 9 7 .
See id.
See id.
See supra p.1898.
See supra note 273.
GOLDBERG, supra note 273.
See suprap.1 8 98.
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rule is something analogous to the civil religion that Robert Bellah
has observed in American practice. Bellah observes that there are
"certain common elements of religious orientation that the great
majority of Americans share" and that "provide a religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, including the political
sphere." 94 This orientation, which he labeled "the American civil
3 9 included as
religion,""
its tenets "the existence of God, the life to
come, the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the
exclusion of religious intolerance."3 9 6 This civil religion does not,
however, include such controversial matters as the divinity of Jesus
Christ. '"The God of the civil religion is not only rather 'unitarian,'
he is also on the austere side, much more related to order, law, and
right than to salvation and love.
Robert Wuthnow observes that the American civil religion
described by Bellah has been fragmenting in recent years into two
very different visions. 8 ' A conservative narrative holds that
America's government is legitimate because it reflects biblical
principles and has the potential to evangelize the world.3 99 A liberal
narrative holds that America has a responsibility to use its vast
resources to alleviate the material problems that face the world. °0
In this liberal narrative, "[flaith plays a role chiefly as a motivating
element, supplying strength to keep going against what often
appear as insuperable odds. ' 40 1 The two visions have become
increasingly hostile to one another. 40 2 As a consequence, neither can
effectively claim to speak for common American values.
The civil religion implied by the hands-off rule cannot by itself
provide such common values. But neither does it preclude them.
It is even more abstract than Bellah's Unitarian civic God. 403 It is
a negative God, a God without predicates. 40 4 The hands-off rule re394. ROBERT N. BELLAH, CivilReligion inAmerica,in BEYoNDBELIEF: ESSAYS ONRELIGION
IN A PosT-TRADITIoNAL WORLD 168, 171 (1970).
395. Id.
396. Id. at 172.
397. Id. at 175.
398. See WUTHNOW, supra note 44, at 241-67.
399. Id. at 244-47.
400. Id. at 250-51.
401. Id. at 251.
402. Id. at 254-55.
403. See supra text accompanying note 398.
404. See Anthony Kenny, Worshippingan Unknown God, 19 RATIo (n.s.) 441 (2006).
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veals its reverence for the Absolute by omitting all reference to it in
public decisionmaking. The aspiration should be for an eloquent
silence, like a rest in music.
B. The Shaping of Modern Religion
The usefulness of an exceedingly abstract conception of the value
of religion is reinforced by the recent work of Charles Taylor on the
history and character of modern religion.4 °5 Taylor shows why
convergence on any set of theological propositions is an impossibility
in the modern world, and so cannot be a basis for social unity. A
neo-Madisonian conception of religion will have to abstract away
from such propositions. Madison's studied ambiguity has a lesson
for us: the religion that needs protection from corruption will have
to be conceptualized in a way that takes no sides in today's religious
controversies.
Taylor argues that the emergence of a world in which theism is
one option among others has roots in Christian theology.4" 6 From
this he infers that the gap between theism and secularism is less
profound than many think; "both emerge from the same long process
of Reform in Latin Christendom."4 "' But his story also implies that
atheism is going to be with us as an existential option for the
foreseeable future. His historical work reveals possibilities for social
unity, the kind of reconciliation of diverse religious factions that
Madison accomplished, but the reconciliation will not consist in
shared theological beliefs.
In the primitive world of nature rituals and tribal deities, there
was no clear distinction between the immanent and the transcendent. The sense of cosmic order pervaded everything.4 8 The individual was deeply embedded in this world; there were no clear
boundaries between self and nonself, personal agency and impersonal force.40 9 Possession by demons was a real and terrifying

405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

See TAYLOR, supra note 384, at 1-4.
Id. at 19-22.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 25-26, 32-33, 40-41.
Id. at 32, 39.
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possibility.4 1 ° In such circumstances, unbelief was literally unthink-

able.411
Around the middle of the first millennium B.C., the great world
faiths appeared. Following Karl Jaspers, Taylor calls this moment
'
the "Axial Revolution."412
Confucius, Siddhartha Gautama, the
Hebrew prophets, Socrates, and Plato brought new visions of
universal ethics and individual salvation.4"3 A new line was drawn
between the sacred and the profane. A world that had been unified
was now divided between the disordered lower realm and the higher
aspiration toward which individuals were to strive.414 The new
imperative toward moral improvement produced what Taylor calls
"the Great Disembedding," in which the individual was separated
from his social and cosmic environments, and Western individualism began.415
Taylor focuses on the evolution of the Christian world. From the
beginning, he argues, there was a tension in Christianity between
salvation for all, promised by a transcendent God, and the pagan
practices and habits of mind that persisted among the laity.41 ' This
kind of tension, between the life of religious ascetics and the
inevitably less perfect lives of ordinary people, is present in all
civilizations organized around post-Axial religions, but Latin
Christendom is distinguished by "the deep and growing dissatisfaction with it.

41 7

The movement that culminated in the Reformation

began in the Middle Ages. After the Hildebrandine Reform of the
eleventh century, there were repeated efforts by the Church, first to
reform its own practices, and later to restrain as idolatrous the
veneration of saints' relics, magic, miracle-mongering, and dancing
around the maypole. 48 The Protestant Reformation radicalized this
move by abolishing this tension and inaugurating the "priesthood
of all believers." The idea gradually took hold that everyone, not
only the clergy, could practice the virtues of the Gospel. Ordinary
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Id. at 32, 36-37, 39.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 151-53.
Id. at 146-58.
Id. at 61-75.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 104, 242-43, 265-66.
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life, including work, play, and sex, began to take on sacred
meaning."'
The Christian virtues were no longer those of ascetic monks; an
ethos of personal responsibility and self-discipline became available
to everyone. This attempt to bring Christ into a world that had
become desacralized inspired a new focus on that world.42 ° Human
beings now had to inhabit the world "as agents of instrumental
reason, working the system effectively in order to bring about God's
purposes; because it is through these purposes, and not through
signs, that God reveals himself in his world."42 '
This disengaged stance toward a disenchanted world became the
moral basis of the new scientific method. Technological control of
the world became yet another way of doing God's work, benefiting
the human race in accordance with His plan.4 22 The highest goal was
understood to be "a certain kind of human flourishing, in a context
of mutuality, pursuing each his/her happiness on the basis of
assured life and liberty, in a society of mutual benefit."42 3
The this-worldly ethos thus begotten eventually made it possible
to cut loose from religiosity altogether. Once "God's goals for us
shrink to the single end of our encompassing this order of mutual
' it is easy for God to drop out of the
benefit he has designed for us,"424
picture. The goal of order becomes simply a matter of human
flourishing, and the power to pursue that goal is a "purely human
capacity," not something we receive from God.4 25
Thus, a reforming movement in Christianity was in time transformed into militant secularism. In this new vision, Christianity is
a danger to the goods of the modern moral order; it risks fanaticism
and estrangement from our own nature.4 2 6 Religion is suspect
because it posits transcendent goals that are alien to human
fulfillment; it is, in fact, the enemy of human fulfillment. Moreover,
419. Id. at 179. The story of the growing affirmation of everyday life is more fully developed
in CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 211-302
(1989) [hereinafter SOURCES OF THE SELF].
420. TAYLOR, supra note 384, at 94.
421. Id. at 98.
422. See especially the discussion of Francis Bacon in SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note
419, at 230-33.
423. TAYLOR, supra note 384, at 430.
424. Id. at 221.
425. Id. at 84.
426. Id. at 230, 239, 305, 308-09, 546-47.
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the problem of theodicy becomes more acute in a world in which the
purposes of the world are understood to center around human
flourishing: 'The idea of blaming God gets a clearer sense and
becomes much more salient in the modern era where people begin
to think they know just what God was purposing in creating the
world, and can check the results against the intention. 42 7
But the secular world view has discontents of its own, manifest
in repeated waves of Romantic protest. It can beget a sense "that
something central is missing, some great purpose, some 61an, some
fulfillment, without which life has lost its point. 4 28 It also has no
good account of its own commitment to universal benevolence, which
it cannot disentangle fully from its roots in Christian agape.429
That I am left with human concerns doesn't tell me to take
universal human welfare as my goal; nor does it tell me that
freedom is important, or fulfillment, or equality. Just being
confined to human goods could just as well find expression in my
concerning myself exclusively with my own material welfare, or
that of my family and immediate milieu. The in fact very exigent
demands of universal justice and benevolence which characterize
modern humanism can't be explained just by the subtraction of
earlier goals and allegiances.43 °
The claim that universal benevolence is just part of human nature
is not especially plausible. It also cannot account for "our sense that
there is something higher, nobler, more fully human about universal
sympathy."4 3 ' It is unclear how this benevolence can be sustained in
the face of the manifest shortcomings of actual human beings.4 32
Secularism and religious belief are each animated, for many of
their adherents, by pictures of the world in which the other position
is simply unimaginable. 413 "What pushes us one way or the other is
what we might describe as our over-all take on human life, and its

427. Id. at 388.

428. Id. at 312; see also id. at 302.
429. Id. at 245-59.
430. Id. at 572.

431. Id. at 694.
432. Id. at 697.
433. Id. at 549. "The spin of closure which is hegemonic in the Academy is a case in point."

Id.
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cosmic and (if any) spiritual surroundings."43' 4 It is possible to feel
some of the force of each opposing position, to stand "in that open
space where you can feel the winds pulling you, now to belief, now
'
to unbelief," but "this feat is relatively rare."435
What is far more common is to occupy some specific intermediate
point between the polar positions.43 6 For the past few centuries,
there has been a growing proliferation of views that do this, first
among the elite and then later generalized to the whole society.437
Taylor observes:
[T]he gamut of intermediate positions greatly widens: many
people drop out of active practice while still declaring themselves as belonging to some confession, or believing in God. On
another dimension, the gamut of beliefs in something beyond
widens, fewer declaring belief in a personal God, while more hold
to something like an impersonal force; in other words a wider
range of people express religious beliefs which move outside
Christian orthodoxy. Following in this line is the growth of nonChristian religions, particularly those originating in the Orient,
and the proliferation of New Age modes of practice, of views
which bridge the humanist/spiritual boundary, of practices
which link spirituality and therapy. On top of this more and
more people adopt what would earlier have been seen as
untenable positions, e.g., they consider themselves Catholic
while not accepting many crucial dogmas, or they combine
Christianity with Buddhism, or they pray while not being
certain they believe."
This entire historical movement "has opened a space in which
people can wander between and around all these options without
having to land clearly and definitively in any one."4 39 This, Taylor
insists, does not mean simply the decline of religion, but at the same
time "a new placement of the sacred or spiritual in relation to
individual and social life. This new placement is now the occasion

434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 550.
at 549.
at 512.
at 423.
at 513.
at 351.
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for recompositions of spiritual life in new forms, and for new ways
of existing both in and out of relation to God. 44 °
Whatever position is held depends on its resonance for the
individual. The reforming emphasis on free faith inevitably
decentralizes; it is contradictory to seek "a Church tightly held
together by a strong hierarchical authority, which will nevertheless
be filled with practitioners of heartfelt devotion."44 ' What matters
is personal insight, without which external formulas are useless. 42
The upshot is an ethic of authenticity, in which people are encouraged to discover their own way in the world, to "do [their] own
thing."' 4
This complicates any religiously-based sense of group identity. It
is particularly a problem in those regimes, of which the United
States is a notable example, in which "the senses of belonging to
group and confession are fused, and the moral issues of the group's
history tend to be coded in religious categories. 4 44 It is hard to think
of America as "one nation under God" when we disagree so radically
about the nature of God. At the time the Constitution was framed,
a society that tried to realize immanent goods was understood to be
identical with a society obedient to God's will. Because these have
come apart, both sides of today's culture wars can plausibly claim to
be effectuating the Founders' design.44 5
It is nonetheless possible to believe that the fragmentation of
religions conceals a larger unity. This belief is encapsulated, Taylor
observes, in the familiar American injunction to worship in the
church of your choice:

440. Id. at 437.
441. Id. at 466.
442. Id. at 489.
443. Id. at 475. The point is elaborated in SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 419, and in
CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHIcs OFAUTHENTICITY (1991). This individualist framework does not
necessarily mean that the content will be individuating; people may find themselves joining
radically communitarian religions. TAYLOR, supranote 384, at 516. This idea is developed in
CHARLES TAYLOR, VARIETIES OF RELIGION TODAY: WILLIAM JAMES REvISITED (2002).
444. TAYLOR, supra note 384, at 458. For recent evidence of the individualistic basis of even
communitarian traditions in the contemporary United States, see ALAN WOLFE, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION: How WE ACTUALLY LWVE OUR FAITH (2003). For
example, Catholics now tend to describe their worship in terms of the personal significance
of their faith. Fifty years ago, Catholics placed much more emphasis on doctrinal truth or
correct liturgy. Id. at 10-17.
445. See TAYLOR, supra note 384, at 447-48.
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This supposes that each church doesn't just operate for its own
ends, in competition, even hostility to others. There will inevitably be lots of that. But the idea is that there will also be a
convergence, a synergy in their ethical effect. So that together,
least those of
they constitute a wider body, a "church"--or at 446
them do which fit within certain tolerable limits.

Those limits have shifted over time: Catholics were originally
outside; by the mid-twentieth century, Jews and Catholics were
included; the circle has widened again to include Muslims. 447 Taylor
observes:
Denominationalism implies that churches are all equally
options, and thrives best in a r6gime of separation of church and
state, de facto if not de jure. But on another level, the political
"church,"
entity can be identified with the broader, over-arching
448
and this can be a crucial element in its patriotism.

The lesson I draw from Taylor's magisterial narrative is that
religious fragmentation is an irresistible and ongoing trend, and
that, therefore, any attempt to define communal identity in any but
the vaguest terms is a prescription for inevitable division. 449 A
persistent theme in all of the classic accounts of corruption that we
reviewed in Part III was the idea that religion is individual, and
that state interference distorts it. Modern developments have
radicalized this individualistic tendency, although, as our discussion
of Milton and Roger Williams shows, it was there from the beginning.

446. Id. at 453-54.
447. Id. at 454, 524.
448. Id. at 454. This, Taylor thinks, has to include overtly religious participants in public
life, so that
God or religion is not precisely absent from public space, but is central to the
personal identities of individuals or groups, and hence always a possible defining
constituent of political identities. The wise decision may be to distinguish our
political identity from any particular confessional allegiance, but this principle
of separation has constantly to be interpreted afresh in its application, wherever
religion is important in the lives of substantial bodies of citizens-which means
virtually everywhere.
CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 193-94 (2004).
449. I draw a few other lessons in Naked Strong Evaluation,56 DISSENT 105 (Winter 2009)
(book review of CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007)).
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The broadening of the American civil religion is a sensible
response to this trend. There are no longer any specific theological
propositions that constitute the common ground. Rather, what
unites the various religious views is a more generalized commitment
to the humane treatment of every human being, the promotion of a
culture of nonviolence and mutual respect.4 s The state should not
discriminate among the citizens who share this common ground.
Taylor's account also suggests that religious evolution is a delicate
process in which the state is unlikely to have much to contribute.
The hamhandedness of any contemporary intervention is the
modern face of corrupting establishment.
At the center of the paradigm case that the Establishment Clause
forbids is the official embrace of religious propositions. Modern
disestablishment, and the contemporary rules of constitutional law
that grow out of it, can be understood to reflect a dialectical
movement within the Reformation.
An immediate consequence of Luther's objections to Church
authority was a growing, and eventually obsessive, focus on
doctrinal disputes. Elaborate theological edifices such as Calvin's
Institutes of the ChristianReligion and the pronouncements of the
Council of Trent brought about an understanding of religion that
was based less on piety and ritual than on intellectual assent.45 '
Religious persecution during the Reformation was based centrally
on the victims' refusal to accept specified philosophical claims. Thus,
Diarmaid MacCulloch observes that thousands of Protestants in
sixteenth-century Europe were burned at the stake for denying the
essence-accident distinction posited by Aristotle, who never heard
of Jesus Christ. 452 Besides the frightful carnage this produced, this
persecution also insulted the ideal of authenticity whose growth
Taylor traces. That insult, and the hypocrisy it invited, was felt by
many at the time to constitute a corruption of religion. All of the
writers whom we are examining are reacting against this. Consider,
for example, Locke's claim that "true and saving Religion consists
450. See A GLOBAL ETHIC: THE DECLARATION OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE WORLD'S
RELIGIONS (1993).
451. JAMES TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN

AMERICA 23-25 (1985). This conception of religion is shared by modern atheists, who
understand religion to consist essentially of dubious factual claims. Indeed, as Turner shows,
modern atheism was made possible by this conception of religion.
452. DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY 25 (2003).
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in the inward perswasion of the Mind, without which nothing can be
acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the Understanding,
that it cannot be compell'd to the belief of any thing by outward
' Locke here
force."453
presumes that religion is a matter of assent to
propositions, and that corruption of religion consists in the absurd
attempt to force such assent.
Locke's protest resounds in contemporary law, with its injunction
that the state keep its hands off religious doctrine. The corruption
that the Establishment Clause is aimed at preventing consists
centrally in the imposition of religious doctrine by the state. The
centrality of doctrine to the clause's prohibition arises out of a very
specific history. But it continues to resonate with our situation
today: doctrinal disagreement is even more profound than it was
then.
VI. OBJECTIONS

The corruption claim is, as we have seen, necessarily parasitic on
some conception of the good that is allegedly being corrupted. So,
any claim of corruption of religion must be parasitic on a claim
about the good of religion-or, as we have seen, about the cluster of
claims that constitute that good.
The persuasiveness of the corruption claim that I have formulated
here, therefore, depends on the contingency that you, my audience,
agree that there is a genuine good in what I am trying to protect. If
you think that there is some deep and enduring source of value in
the cluster of ends I have described, and you think that the state is
likely to choose badly if it is called upon to determine the relative
merits of the ends within the cluster, or of the particular avenues by
which any of these ends are pursued, then you have reason to want
the state to treat religion as a good in precisely the way that I have
described here. And, for the reasons I have given, that will entail,
among other things, a hands-off rule.
The argument I have offered gives rise to obvious objections. I will
consider three. First, one might object that the conception of
"religion" I have offered is not specific enough, protecting some
activities that are worthless. Second, one might object that it is too
specific, unfairly privileging some activities over other equally
453. LOCKE, supranote 121, at 26.
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valuable ones. Finally, one could claim that the entire approach is
misguided because it is not appropriate to use such a contestable
conception of the good as "religion," even defined as capaciously as
I have proposed, in an argument for any particular deployment of
political power.
The first objection has been developed by Timothy Macklem.4 54
Recall that Greenawalt and others have argued that "religion"
should be given its conventional meaning, as denoting a set of
activities united only by a family resemblance, with no set of
necessary or sufficient conditions demarcating the boundaries of the
set.4"' My proposal follows from and elaborates on Greenawalt's
claim. Macklem objects that the question of what "religion" conventionally means is a semantic one, but the question of what beliefs
are entitled to special treatment is a moral one, and it requires a
moral rather than a semantic answer.45 6
Macklem's analytical point is sound. But there are powerful
reasons for denying the state the power to judge the objective value
of particular religions. Macklem himself inadvertently displays
those reasons when he proposes that courts undertake "a frank
examination of the contribution that any doctrine held on the basis
of faith, be it traditional or non-traditional, is capable of making to
well-being. 45 7 In a pluralistic society, there are obvious dangers in
giving judges the power to assign legal consequences to different
religious beliefs based on the judges' own conceptions of well-being.
Macklem's own confident withholding of protection from "cults" is
not reassuring.4 58 The decision to define religion vaguely, relying on
the fuzzy semantic meaning, itself rests on moral grounds.
David Richards has developed the second objection, attacking
Greenawalt from the opposite direction by arguing that commonsense conceptions of religion "hopelessly track often unprincipled
and ad hoc majoritarian intuitions of 'proper' or 'real' religion."45' 9
This is a version of the corruption argument: the majoritarian
intuitions he describes will distort the exercise of the individual
conscience, which is the truly valuable thing that the disestablish454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

See TIMOTHY MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND (2006).
See supra notes 368-70 and accompanying text.
MACKLEM, supra note 454, at 120-26.
Id. at 142.

Id.
See RICHARDS, supra note 334, at 142.
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ment of religion ought to protect. His objection is the same as
Macklem's: the question of what to protect is a moral, not a
semantic one. While Macklem would narrow protection, however,
Richards would broaden it. Richards has argued that the moral
basis of the Free Exercise Clause is "a negative liberty immunizing
from state coercion the exercise of the conceptions of a life well and
ethically lived and expressive of a mature person's rational and
reasonable powers."4" His broadly libertarian account entails that
"the right to conscience protects the sphere of action when state
intervention therein is not justified by the protection of all-purpose
goods."4 6' For Richards, conscientious objections to law need not be
based on morality or religion; it is enough that they arise out of the
agent's exercise of his practical reason. This, he acknowledges,
entails constitutional protection for "everything and anything."4 6 2
The concerns that motivate Richards's philosophy are rooted in
his own experience as a young gay man in the 1960s and 1970s,
when he took professional risks in order to be forthright and
truthful about his sexuality. He was an early and courageous
defender of gay rights at a time when most gay academics were
deeply closeted and terrified of writing about these issues.4 63 The
right to conscience, he argues, protects "our moral autonomy in
acknowledging the ethical principles that both define personal
integrity and give shape indissolubly to the unity of belief and
action that is one's life."4 It is hard to see whose claims would be
excluded by this principle: gay men who are less earnest and serious
than Richards? The unserious gay man is also exercising his
rational and reasonable powers. Richards himself is driven by
concerns of a moral depth that his principle fails to capture.46 5
460. Id. at 140.
461. Id. at 144.
462. Id. at 141.
463. He describes his personal history in DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS:
FROM BOWERS TO LAWRENCE AND BEYOND 6-9 (2005). Richards's position on the scope of the
religion clauses is followed by Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious
and the Secular: A FoundationalChallenge to FirstAmendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 837 (1995), who cites him with approval at 963 n.535.
464. RICHARDS, supra note 334, at 144.
465. Moral seriousness is more salient in Joseph Raz's otherwise similar account of the
reasons to protect conscientious objection. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS
ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979). Raz thinks that the case for accommodating conscientious
objectors depends on self-definition: "The areas of a person's life and plans which have to be
respected by others are those which are central to his own image of the kind of person he is
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The problem with any claim that purports to insulate all human
conduct from state interference is that a rule that nominally
protects everything in fact protects nothing. There are indeed plural
values of great weight. Religion does not outweigh all other human
concerns. But there is no way to operationalize a rule that one must
protect all deeply valuable activities. All one can do is enumerate
and protect them one at a time.46 6
The deepest objection to what I have proposed is Rawlsian. "[O]ur
exercise of political power is fully proper," Rawls argues, "only when
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of
which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their
common human reason."4 6 The basic idea of political liberalism is
that people with different comprehensive conceptions of the good
can and should reach an "overlapping consensus" on the principles
of political cooperation. 46 ' They may disagree about the ultimate
foundations of the political principles that govern them, but they
agree upon the principles, those principles are moral ones, and they
are affirmed on moral grounds.46 9
A common ground strategy entails endless political struggle. The
common ground is contingent and subject to continuing negotiation.
The upshot is a messier liberal theory than the kind attempted by,
for example, Rawls. A common ground strategy is, from Rawls's
point of view, costly, because it gives up on the idea of universal
civic friendship. That is the deepest problem with the corruption
argument: it necessarily depends on a contestable conception of the
good-in my formulation, the value of religion, understood very
abstractly-and so can have no persuasive power to those who do
not see any value in the good that the corruption argument seeks to
protect. On this basis, Samuel Freeman, one of Rawls's most
prominent followers and expositors, concludes that public reason
excludes all comprehensive conceptions from public and even
and which form the foundation of his self-respect." Id. at 280. This understanding goes beyond
religion or conscience. "A law preventing dedicated novelists from pursuing their vocation
with the freedom essential to it is as bad, and bad for the same reasons, as a law conscripting
pacifists to the army." Id. at 281.
466. See Koppelman, supra note 54.
467. JOHN RAWLs, PoLTIcAL LIBERALISM 137 (1996).
468. Id. at 134.
469. See id. at 144-50.
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private deliberations about coercive laws.47 ° This is why "[a]ppeals
to Christian doctrine simply do not count as good public reasons in
our political culture."4 7' The same can equally be said of all appeals
to the idea that religion as such is a good to be promoted.
The Rawlsian objection to the claim about the good of religion
that I have formulated here is that some people reasonably reject it,
and that it, therefore, is not an appropriate basis for the exercise of
political power. The idea that the search for meaning in life is good,
Martha Nussbaum writes,
is just a bit too dogmatic. We live in a country in which many
people are skeptics, doubting that there is such a thing as the
ultimate meaning of life, and where many others have dogmatic
anti-meaning views. For the government to declare what
Koppelman declares goes just a bit too far for true fairness to
such skeptical and/or anti-metaphysical views.47 '
A regime that treats religion as a good is illegitimate for the same
reason that a regime that treats Christianity as a good is illegitimate. It is not a regime "the essentials of which all citizens as free
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason."4'73
Because the corruption argument favors religion only by keeping
the state away from it, it does not bias the basic structure in the
ways that concern Rawls. No one's life chances are adversely
affected by their holding any particular religious views. The
favoring of religion by the corruption argument is in no way
inconsistent with freedom of conscience. On the contrary, it is one
path to such freedom.
A Rawlsian might still object to the favoring of religion by rules
that disable government from deciding religious questions, in the
way that the rules described at the beginning of this Article do,
because these rules make a contestable idea of the good into part of
the basic structure. The objection is related to Rawls's conception of

470. See SAMUEL FREEMAN, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS ON RAWLSIAN

POLITIcAL PHILOSOPHY (2007).
471. Id. at 201; see also id. at 200, 220, 224.
472. NUSSBAUM, supra note 54, at 168.

473. RAWLS, supra note 467, at 137.

1924

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1831

distributive justice. If government is going to be concerned with
distributive justice at all, then it needs to know what it is distributing. One of the distinguishing marks of a liberal political theory is
that it will decline to specify those goods too precisely: there are
good reasons for keeping "salvation by Christ" off the list.
Rawls sought to base his own theory of distributive justice on a
thin theory of the good because he did not want government
deciding any issue of deep value. In his final formulation, the
primary goods that are the objects of distributive justice are citizens'
needs understood from a political point of view. According to the
political conception, every person has higher-order interests in
developing and exercising his moral powers to develop a sense of
justice and a conception of the good. Justice requires "conditions
securing for those powers their adequate development and full
' The primary
exercise."4 74
goods are "essential all-purpose means to
realize the higher-order interests connected with citizens' moral
powers and their determinate conceptions of the good (so far as the
restrictions on information permit the parties to know this). 4 75
Obviously, religion cannot be a primary good in this sense; one can
exercise one's moral powers without religion. The mere fact that
most people value something highly does not make it a primary
good.4 76
But the thin theory of the good that Rawls lays out is too parsimonious a basis for human rights. Aspects of the person that are not
involved in the exercise of the moral powers may nonetheless be
very important. For example, Rawls lacks the resources to condemn
female genital mutilation, which does not deprive its victims of their
moral powers or their normal capacities for cooperation. Female
genital mutilation hurts its victims in other ways.4 vv If a fuller
conception of the person and the person's needs than Rawls offers
are needed, then Rawls is poorly positioned to object to the inclusion
of religious concerns in that catalog of needs.47 8
474. Id. at 74.
475. Id. at 76.
476. Id. at 308.
477. The argument of the previous two paragraphs is developed in detail in Andrew
Koppelman, The Limits of Constructivism:CanRawls Condemn Female Genital Mutilation?,
REV. POL. (forthcoming 2009).
478. So is Nussbaum. She argues that political respect should be given to "the faculty with
which each person searches for the ultimate meaning of life," not its goal, and that we should
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Rawls evidently thinks that pure constructivism is the only
reliable path to social unity. In modern societies, there is so much
normative pluralism that the only overlapping consensus that is
consistent with respectful relations is that constructed without any
reference to the actual normative views of members of society. That
is why "partially comprehensive" views must be excluded. Political
liberalism, he argues, should be freestanding, so that it "can be
presented without saying, or knowing, or hazarding a conjecture
about, what [comprehensive] doctrines it may belong to, or be
supported by."479 "[Tihe political conception of justice is worked out
first as a freestanding view that can be justified pro tanto without
looking to, or trying to fit, or even knowing what are, the existing
comprehensive doctrines."'
This approach may possibly work
under certain circumstances, but they are likely to be as unusual as
the circumstances in which it is safe to drive a car while blindfolded.
T.M. Scanlon explains why the strategy of surveying and finding
common ground among actual comprehensive views would not be
satisfactory to Rawls.4"' "It would be impossible to survey all
possible comprehensive views and inadequate, in an argument for
stability, to consider just those that are represented in a given
society at a given time since others may emerge at any time and
gain adherents."4 8 2 On the other hand, as the persistence of the
corruption argument over the past 350 years shows, a consensus
built around the convergence of a contingent set of actual views may
last for quite some time.

"agree to respect the faculty without prejudging the question whether there is a meaning to
be found, or what it might be like." NUSSBAUM, supra note 54, at 168-69. This effort to be just
barely specific enough is a delicate one. As other critics of Nussbaum have observed, it is not
clear how one can valorize a capability without valorizing what the capability is for. See, e.g.,
KIMBERLY A. YURACKO, PERFECTIONISM AND CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST VALUEs 41-46 (2003);
Linda Barclay, What Kind of Liberal is Martha Nussbaum?, 4 SATS - NORDIC J. PHILOSOPHY
2, 15-16 (2003), available at http://www.sats.eu.com/issues42.htm.
479. RAWLS, supra note 467, at 12-13.
480. John Rawls, Reply to Habermas,42 J. PHILOSOPHY 132, 145 (1995).
481. T.M. Scanlon, Rawls on Justification,in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 139
(Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
482. Id. at 164.
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VII. UNDERSTANDING THE RULES

Return to the Establishment Clause rules that we had trouble
explaining at the outset: no endorsement of religion; no discrimination against particular religious practices; laws must have secular
purposes; courts will not resolve controversies over religious
doctrine. They are not well tailored to prevent division or alienation.
How will these problems be appreciably worsened if, say, a court
awards property to a claimant after a showing that the opposing
party has departed from church doctrine?4.. If the purpose of the
Establishment Clause is to prevent corruption of religion, on the
other hand, all of these rules make sense. The central evil is actions
of the government that are intended to manipulate the religious
beliefs of the citizens. That is why the state cannot engage in speech
endorsing religious propositions, employ religious tests, or enact
laws that are tantamount to endorsement of religious propositions
because they have no secular purpose. Discrimination among
religions is likewise an effort to interfere in the development of
religious doctrine. An obvious corollary is the state's incompetence
to resolve controversies over religious doctrine. "[The government
may not displace the free religious choices of its citizens by placing
its weight behind a particular religious belief, tenet, or sect."4"
An obvious implication of the corruption argument is that the
state may not declare religious truth.4"' All of the religious practices
that the authors considered here objected to had this as a common
element. To review: Milton opposed the censorship of heresy and
the payment of clergy by the Crown.4 Roger Williams objected to

483. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
484. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 733 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Laurence Tribe observes that all nine of the justices in this case agreed with this
proposition. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 1240.
485. I set forth this premise as axiomatic in Koppelman, supra note 7. Some writers have
observed that this premise was inadequately defended in that article. See, e.g., Michael J.
Perry, What Do the Free Exercise and Nonestablishment Norms Forbid? Reflections on the
ConstitutionalLaw of Religious Freedom, 1 U. ST. THoMAS L.J. 549, 570-72 (2003); Steven D.
Smith, Barnette'sBig Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 634-36 (2003). The present Article
is, in part, a response.
486. See supraPart III.A.1.
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similar practices in colonial Massachusetts.4 7 Locke opposed the
repression of religious dissenters.4 " Pufendorf wrote against Louis
XIV's repression of Protestantism. 48 9 Elisha Williams opposed a law
banning ministers from preaching outside their parishes.4 9 Backus
and Leland fought religious taxes and the jailing of unlicensed
preachers.49 ' Jefferson opposed religious coercion and taxation.4 92
Madison opposed nonpreferential support for churches.49 3
Official declarations of religious truth raise recurring, core
concerns of the corruption argument: that the state will manipulate
religion to serve its own, decidedly nonreligious ends; that citizens
will be induced to profess the state's religious line in order to curry
official favor; and that the state will meddle in matters of great
importance, with respect to which it is incompetent and untrustworthy.
The core Establishment Clause violation, from the perspective of
the corruption argument, is action by the state that intentionally
manipulates religion to serve official ends. Actions that have the
incidental and unintended effect of advancing or inhibiting particular religious ideas present more ambiguous cases, and so it is harder
to say what the corruption argument implies about them. It
happens that the boundary that separates clear from contested
issues in Establishment Clause doctrine runs along precisely these
lines. We have already reviewed the areas of clarity. Now, consider
the field of uncertainty.
Three questions dominate contemporary religion clause scholarship. First, should religiously based exemptions from generally
49 4
applicable laws be determined by the courts or the legislatures?
487. See supraPart III.A.2.
488. See supraPart IIIA.3.
489. See supraPart III.A.4.
490. See supraPart III.A.5.
491. See supraParts III.B.1, III.B.4.
492. See supraPart III.B.2.
493. See supraPart III.B.5.
494. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 55; MARCI HAMILTON, GODVS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005); NUSSBAUM, supra note 54; Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasisfor Protecting
Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1304-06 (1994); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An
Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998); Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the
Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT.
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Second, is it appropriate for citizens to seek to enact laws based on
their religious beliefs?49 5 And third, may government directly fund
religious activity, so long as the principle that determines who gets
the funding is not itself religious?4 96
L. REV. 75 (1990); Laycock, supra note 4, at 347-48; Ira C. Lupu, The CaseAgainst Legislative
Codificationof Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565 (1999); Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the
Village of Kiryas Joel,96 COLUM. L. REV. 104 (1996); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI.L. REV. 308 (1991); William P. Marshall, The Case
Against the ConstitutionallyCompelledFree Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357
(1989-90); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115
(1992); Suzanna Sherry, Enlighteningthe Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473
(1996); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: ParadoxRedux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123; Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992); Symposium,
Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 597 (1998); Symposium,
Religion in Public Life: Access, Accommodation, and Accountability, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
599 (1992); Symposium, State and FederalReligious Liberty Legislation:Is It Necessary? Is
It Constitutional?Is It Good Policy?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415 (1999); Symposium, The James
R. Browning Symposium for 1994: The Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 56 MONT. L. REV.
1 (1995); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited,
1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373; Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of FreeExercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L.
REV. 117.
495. See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI AND NICHOLAS WOLTERSDORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC
SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE (1996); ROBERT AUDI,
RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON (2000); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF
DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993);
CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2002); KENT
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD?
RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2003); MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES (1997); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE
ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); RAWLS, supra note 467;
RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997); PAUL J. WEITHMAN,
RELIGIONAND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (2002); David M. Smoln, RegulatingReligious
and CulturalConflict in PostmodernAmerica: A Response to ProfessorPerry, 76 IOWA L. REV.
1067 (1991); Symposium, Religiously Based Morality:Its ProperPlace in American Law and
Public Policy?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217 (2001); Symposium, The Role of Religion in
Public Debate in a Liberal Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 643 (1993); Sanford Levinson,
Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2061 (1992) (reviewing
MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (1991)).
496. See, e.g., Commentary, On School Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 31 CONN.
L. REV. 803 (1999); Steven K. Green, PrivateSchool Vouchers and the Confusion Over "Direct"
Aid, 10 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 47 (1999/2000); Steffen N. Johnson, A Civil Libertarian
Case for the Constitutionalityof School Choice, 10 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1 (1999/2000);
Michael W. McConnell, The Selective FundingProblem:Abortions and Religious Schools, 104
HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991); Allan E. Parker, Jr. & R. Clayton Trotter, Hostility or Neutrality?
Faith-BasedSchools and Tax.Funded Tuition: A GIBill for Kids, 10 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS.
L.J. 83 (1999/2000); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades,Public Squares and Voucher Payments:
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With respect to the first question, almost everyone agrees that
some exemptions, such as excusing Quakers from military service,
are permissible. The hard and hotly disputed question is whether
those exemptions should be made by the legislature or the judiciary.
That is a question of comparative institutional competence, and the
corruption argument says nothing about it. The corruption argument, as we have noted, presupposes that religion is in some way a
good thing. That presupposition offers the way out of the free
exercise/establishment dilemma. The corruption argument is thus
not inconsistent with religious accommodation, which rests on the
same premise.
The concern about religious accommodation that the corruption
argument highlights is that accommodation can sometimes be an
occasion of hypocrisy. From its earliest formulations, the corruption
argument has rested on the premise that only genuinely felt
religious activity has value; a persistent objection to establishment
has been that it produces feigned and therefore worthless religion.
Exemptions can produce such hypocrisy. But this is a reason for
being selective in making accommodations available, so that they
are given more stingily when they involve some substantial secular
benefit.49 7 It is not a reason to reject exemptions as such.
As for the second question, the corruption argument is not, in any
way, an argument that it is inappropriate for citizens to vote based
on their religious beliefs. Its concern is that the coercive power of
the state will be deployed to manipulate the religious beliefs of the
citizens, not that the citizens' political behavior will be influenced
by their own beliefs. It comes into play only when the state enacts
a law that lacks a secular purpose and so is tantamount to an
official declaration of religious truth.49
Finally, there is the question of funding for religious activity.
Here, it matters crucially whether the state is making a religious
determination when it provides the support. If it is making such a
determination, then it is violating the core prohibition against the
Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REV. 243 (1996); Symposium, Education
Reform at the Crossroads, 10 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 107 (1999/2000); Symposium,
Symposium on Law and Religion, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 239 (1999).
497. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1016-18 (1990).
498. See generally Koppelman, supra note 7.
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declaration of religious truth, and concerns about corruption come
to the fore. If it is not, then the issue is, as with the exemption
question, whether incentives for hypocrisy and pressure on religious
minorities are being created.4 99 That is a question of fact, and so the
corruption argument has no clear implications about the question.
What about ceremonial Deism? Questions of religious doctrine are
in fact directly addressed by the placement of "In God We Trust" on
currency, or "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. The Supreme
Court has sometimes claimed that these practices are not really
religious, but that is a silly argument, as they are overtly and
conspicuously religious. 5°°
The general rule now seems to be that old forms of Deism are
grandfathered, but newer ones are unconstitutional. As noted
earlier, Justice Breyer, in the recent Ten Commandments cases,
invalidated a recent display while upholding an older one.50 1 Justice
50 2
O'Connor, in her concurrence in the Pledge of Allegiance case,
explicitly made the age of a ceremonial acknowledgement relevant
to its constitutionality. She thought that constitutionality was supported by the absence of worship or prayer, the absence of reference
to a particular religion, and minimal religious content. 50 3 But the
first of her factors was "history and ubiquity."5 4 "The constitutional
value of ceremonial Deism turns on a shared understanding of its
legitimate nonreligious purposes," O'Connor wrote. °5 'That sort of
understanding can exist only when a given practice has been in
place for a significant portion of the Nation's history, and when it is
observed by enough persons that it can fairly be called ubiquitous."50 6 The consequence is to make old and familiar forms of
ceremonial Deism constitutional, but to discourage innovation.
499. Here, I am basically in agreement with the analysis offered in EISGRUBER & SAGER,
supra note 33, at 198-239. The gap in their analysis, one on which they do not dwell, is that
no constitutional issue is raised if pressure is placed on other ideological minorities, such as
racists. Their argument implicitly singles out religion for special treatment without admitting
that that is what it is doing. See Koppelman, supra note 61.
500. This is elegantly argued by GEDICKS, supra note 17, at 62-80.
501. See supra note 16.
502. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33-45 (2004) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
503. Id.
504. Id. at 37.
505. Id.
506. Id.
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There are two aspects of this area of the law that distinguish it.
The first is that it represented a common ground strategy-an
effort, in its own time, to understand "religion" in an ecumenical
and nonsectarian way. At the time that these elements of civil
religion were put in place, the existence of God appeared to be the
one aspect of religion that was common to the various religious
factions then dominant in American life. This was true of the vague
Deism embraced in the Declaration of Independence and the
speeches of the Presidents, beginning with Washington; it was also
true of the idea of a "Judeo-Christian" ethic that was invented in the
1950s.5 °7 This old settlement is part of the background in which
contemporary American religion has developed. Its continuation is
not an effort by an incumbent administration to manipulate
religion. It simply recognizes that people are invested, in some cases
very deeply, in the status quo. °8
Of course, ceremonial Deism has an effect on religion. It produces
a culture in which many people feel that their religious beliefs are
somehow associated with patriotism. This has the salutary effect of
fostering civic unity and common moral ideals and tempering
religious fanaticism. It also has the less attractive effect of encouraging self-righteous nationalism and the idea that whatever the
United States does, however repugnant, is somehow divinely
sanctioned. °5 What matters for present purposes is that neither of
these effects is specifically aimed at by government when it
perpetuates these rituals. Political manipulation, in that sense, is
not occurring. Some writers have argued that government should
aim to minimize its effect on religion, but that goal is not a coherent
one: any government actions at all will cause religion to be different
from what it otherwise would have been. 510
507. See FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 164-70; SILK, supra note 280, at 40-53. Nonsectarian
Bible reading was a less attractive and less successful variant, as it quickly became inflected
with anti-Catholicism. See FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 61-92, 108-10.
508. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1227 (2003).
509. See Jeffrey James Poelvoorde, The American Civil Religion and the American
Constitution,in How DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROTECT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM? 141 (Robert A.
Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1987). For recent examples of the latter unattractive effect, see
Andrew Koppelman, Reading Lolita at Guantanamo, 53 DISSENT 64 (2006).
510. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 33, at 27-28; GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 45156. This is why the corruption argument has so much more bite when government tries to
affect religion as such than when it engages in facially neutral action that has a religious
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Today, on the other hand, the invocation of theism, and specifically the erection of a Ten Commandments display, is an intervention in the bitterest religious controversies that now divide us.5 1'
Douglas Laycock thinks that a lesson of O'Connor's opinion is that
"separationist groups should sue immediately when they encounter
any religious practice newly sponsored by the government." '1 2 That
is precisely the right lesson for them to take. New sponsorship of
religious practices is far more likely to represent a contemporaneous
a live religious controversy than the perpetuaeffort to intervene51 in
3
tion of old forms.
There is one more aspect of the corruption argument that needs
to be considered. This may be the most paradoxical aspect of all: the
argument, even if it plays a powerful role in Establishment Clause
theory, cannot be directly relied upon to decide cases. If a court tries
to decide whether corruption has occurred in any particular case, it
must first decide what a noncorrupted religion looks like. And that
would itself violate the Establishment Clause.
Justice Souter, the principal modern proponent of the corruption
rationale, has fallen squarely into this trap. 1 4 Dissenting in Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris,"' in which the Court upheld a program that
allowed parents to pay religious school tuition with state-funded
vouchers, he cited the risk of corruption described by Madison. Then
he declared: "The risk is already being realized."5 1 He noted the
decisions of many religious schools to comply with the Ohio program's requirements that schools not discriminate on the basis of
religion, nor "teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of...
religion."5 1 '
impact, such as providing education vouchers that can be used at religious schools.
511. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 353, at 275.
512. Laycock, supra note 17, at 232.
513. For a similar conclusion, see EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 33, at 147.
514. Hugo Black, who made even more frequent use of the corruption argument, never did.
See supra notes 287-308 and accompanying text. Black's influence on Souter is sometimes
direct, as when Souter quoted with approval Black's declaration that the Framers thought
"that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was
stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions." Hein v.
Freedom From Religion Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2588 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947)).
515. 536 U.S. 639, 711-12 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
516. Id. at 712.
517. Id. at 713.
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Kevin Pybas observes that Justice Souter's argument amounts to
"an accusation that the religious have been unfaithful to their God
and to what their God requires of them."5 1 Pybas is entirely correct
to belabor Souter with the familiar concern about the limits of state
competence:
[H]ow does Justice Souter know when a particular religious
community has compromised its principles? Is he or the Court
generally so well-versed in the theologies of the various religious
traditions in this country that he or it is in a position to say to a
religious community that it has violated its own principles?5 19
Souter's error shows that, even if the corruption rationale is
accepted, it cannot be operationalized as a requirement that courts
look for corruption in particular cases. It is rather a reason for the
state to avoid making any religious determinations at all.52 ° The
corruption concern cannot support a rule that bans state action that
corrupts religion. It should rather be understood as a rule-generating device, "a set of factors that courts [or other rulemakers] should
consider in defining the more precise rules." '2 1
Souter offers a more telling objection to the voucher program's
restrictions when he observes that the ban on teaching "hatred"
itself raises religious questions. This condition, he notes, "could be
understood (or subsequently broadened) to prohibit religions from
teaching traditionally legitimate articles of faith as to the error,
sinfulness, or ignorance of others ....
such understanding
would violate the hands-off rule, for the same reason that it was
violated by the charge of fraud against Edna and Donald Ballard for
claiming that St. Germain had given them extraordinary healing
518. Kevin Pybas, Does the Establishment Clause Require Religion To Be Confined to the
Private Sphere?, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 71, 102 (2005).
519. Id. at 101-02.
520. The point here is analogous to one that Richard Garnett has made about the rule,
sometimes entertained by the Court, that a law may be unconstitutional because it has the
potential to divide the populace along religious lines. See Garnett, supra note 25. Garnett
shows that divisiveness cannot provide a workable criterion for constitutionality. He does not,
however, deny that religious division is one of the underlying concerns of the Establishment
Clause. See id. at 1667.
521. I borrow this distinction from EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED
STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 698 (3d ed. 2008).
522. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 713 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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powers.52 3 Claiming that the Christian religion is the only path to
salvation and that all nonchristians are damned may or may not
constitute "hatred." It is not clear how a state can decide that
without getting into forbidden questions of theology. For example,
a religious group might argue that its claims about the damnation
of nonbelievers reflects loving concern rather than hatred. How
could a state respond to that?
This objection is not fatal to the program, however, because the
"hatred" proviso does not unambiguously require this result. A
familiar canon of statutory construction holds that ambiguous laws
are not to be read in a way that renders them unconstitutional.5 2 4
Federal courts are also not to adjudicate the constitutionality of
ambiguous state laws before the state courts have the opportunity
to interpret them.5 25 For the same reason that a court cannot decide
whether the Ballards's religious claim is fraudulent, it cannot decide
whether such a claim is hateful. If Ohio were to read its hatred
proviso in the way Souter suggests, then that would raise constitutional difficulties. It has not happened yet, however, so it cannot be
an argument against the law's constitutionality.
CONCLUSION

The corruption argument was once the basis for a political
consensus among people with radically differing religious views.
They agreed that religion was valuable, and that it was likely to be
damaged by state efforts to manipulate it. The same understanding
underlies much of modern Establishment Clause doctrine. When the
Court invalidated a prayer that New York State had composed for
public school classrooms, it declared that "[i]t is neither sacrilegious
nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this
country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning
official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people
themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious
guidance. '52" This vision of the Establishment Clause is worth
reviving.
523.
524.
525.
526.

See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 1, § 45:11.
See R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962).
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Citizens do need to share an understanding of what is valuable.
But when the details of this particular Valuable Something are so
hotly disputed, the most effective way for the government to pay it
reverence is just to shut up about it.

